The Panda and the Bear — Echoes of the 20th Century Axis

China and Russia are aligned but not allied, we’re often told. Or, as one leading analyst put it, the brown bear and the panda are cycling side by side, but whether to the same destination is not yet clear.

And of course, it’s true we cannot see the future or where this journey will lead. But we can make an assessment, and frankly, that is far from reassuring. If you doubt it, look at the Germany-Japan axis of the mid-20^th century, which offers some troubling parallels.

There is currently no publicly declared treaty between the two countries. Instead, they have a deepening “comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation” agreement, signed in May, which pledges joint cooperation and complains — at enormous length — about US and allied behavior around the world. 

But Russia is swiftly creating the foundations for a global network of treaties with equally dissatisfied authoritarian states. It agreed a defense deal with North Korea (which has sent thousands of troops to fight Ukraine) in November and will seal a so-called partnership agreement with Iran, including defense and security issues, on January 17.

The Kremlin says Xi will visit Russia this year, and once again Chinese aid to the Russian military machine will be on the agenda.

So, a formal axis? Not yet. The dictionary definition is for a pact “that forms a center for an eventual larger grouping,” but the outlines of the unofficial authoritarian axis are clear enough. The four countries are deeply alienated by the global system and wish to destroy it.

Russia and China seek “to defend their legitimate rights and interests, resist any attempts to hinder the normal development of bilateral ties, interfere in the internal affairs of the two states, and limit [their] economic, technological or foreign policy potential.” Words that are so general as to mean anything at all.

The February 2022 “no-limits” partnership, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was open to several interpretations — not least that Putin may have secured Xi Jinping’s prior agreement to aid his impending all-out war of aggression.

While China was initially measured in its aid to the Kremlin, as it assessed how far the West would support Ukraine, this assistance has grown to the point where it is essential to the Russian war effort.

There is now a visible and important working relationship between Russia and China, including regular and growing military cooperation. This may now include access to previously off-limits areas like nuclear submarine design and technology, which China has long sought.

What are the parallels to the authoritarian axis of the 1930s? There were many ups and downs between the signing of the German-Japan anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 and the Tripartite Pact (that also included Italy) in 1940. The two countries were never in lockstep but always clear that they had a shared goal. Like modern Russia and China, they sought to end the suffocating power of the democratic world.

In the end, Hitler declared war after Pearl Harbor because he felt that a German-US conflict was both inevitable, was virtually underway already in the Atlantic where US Navy warships were increasingly engaged in convoying vessels to the UK, and because he felt the swift application of unrestricted submarine warfare would break the British (as it nearly did.)

The Tripartite Pact was designed to deter US involvement in the war. But no one really expected Hitler to keep his word unless it served his interests, much as no one expects that from Putin now. Paper promises fill the wastebins of strongman politicians.

There are comparisons to be made. Both cases involve two great powers from two separate regions who share a common foe and the common interest of reducing or destroying US global power. As is the case today with Russia and China, Germany and Japan’s goal was not to rule the world jointly but for each to create a “new order.” Germany sought control of Europe, and Japan sought control of Asia.

Both benefitted from the other distracting the US and the UK during the war, but they did not share political or strategic objectives or planning beyond defeating the Allies.

The Nazi high command, for example, had no prior awareness of Tokyo’s intentions to annihilate the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor.

There was little information sharing thereafter. And due to a combination of mistrust and a perception of inadequate Japanese industrial capability, Germany withheld many of the technological advancements it made during the war from the Japanese — most notably radar and submarine innovations. It wasn’t until the spring of 1945 that Germany attempted to deliver advanced weapons technology to Japan — just weeks before surrendering to the Allies.

Operational coordination was very limited. Tokyo rejected Hitler’s request for a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union from the east in support of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The Japanese had their own strategic objectives in Southeast Asia and had been badly beaten by Marshal Zhukov during the Nomonhan Incident in 1939. They had no desire to repeat the experience.

There are then-and-now differences too, and they are significant. While Russia and China are authoritarian states interested in suppressing dissent at home, they apply different strategies abroad. Putin seeks strategic control of Europe through war and influence operations; the primary Chinese objective is to profit from trade partnerships, albeit unbalanced and with a major political element (In 2018, China grabbed a large Sri Lankan port and 15,000 acres close to key global shipping routes as “debt collection,” a move that mimicked Western colonial behavior in the 19^th century.)

But the unifying theme between the mid-20^th century and now is that the democratic world’s enemies don’t need to agree joint action. If they did, of course, it would pose a possibly existential threat — but simply by sharing a common aim, they distract and dilute Western power. That forces policymakers to make choices which can only help the joint enterprise of weakening our defenses.

There is a growing US belief that China is the primary threat — “the leading and most consequential threat to US national security and leadership globally” as the Director of National Intelligence put it in 2023.

This has very obvious benefits for its strategic ally-in-all-but-name, Russia. And the global sense that democracy is under challenge and on the retreat can encourage the notion that the “Global South” (or “global majority” as Putin slyly terms it) is indifferent at best to the great historic themes being fought out in the Northern Hemisphere.

The US and Europe clearly cannot be indifferent to all of this. While it’s true that Asia presents huge growth opportunities, Europe remains absolutely central to US economic wellbeing (the $4 trillion of US investment in Europe is the country’s largest globally, and at least quadruple the figure in Asia) and to its security interests.

But it also needs help in managing this rising threat from authoritarianism. Allies can work together, but can no longer expect the US to effectively shoulder the burden alone.

Donald Trump’s reported demand that Europe raise the floor on defense spending from 2% of GDP to 5% comes as a shock to the continent’s debt-riddled economies. But the focus on security is no longer optional and will require political determination too. That includes a European willingness to join the US in constraining China.

Exploitation of the clear disconnects between Moscow and Beijing will be key in combatting the threat their collaboration poses to global security. New leadership in Brussels and a new administration in Washington are well-positioned to produce tougher policy and reshape the game in 2025. That involves the key recognition by Europe that it is an ally of the US, whatever the formal status of its rivals.

David Kagan is a Program Officer with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) He previously served as deputy to the Editor-in-Chief of The Catalyst, the Bush Institute’s quarterly political journal. Before that, David worked for the International Republican Institute in its Transatlantic Strategy Division.

Francis Harris is Managing Editor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and oversees Europe’s Edge. He was a foreign correspondent with the Daily Telegraph and served in Prague, London, New York, and Washington.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.