Russia is sinking deeper into digital isolation: from the ban on searching for “extremist materials” to the Max messenger, which turns control into a routine
The idea of the so-called “sovereign Internet” is a logical continuation of Russia’s course towards isolationism. Discussions about regulating the Runet began in 2016, when the adviser to the Russian president German Klimenko said that the country should prepare for exclusion from the global Internet. Three years later, on November 1, 2019, the law on the “sovereign Internet” came into force. Theoretically, it envisages the creation of such a system of Internet traffic management in the country that would be aimed at protecting the Runet from an “external threat”. That is, a hypothetical threat that Western countries will exclude Russia from the global network, and therefore the Russians will be ready to preemptively exclude themselves. But in fact, the plan was to strengthen the state’s influence on the Internet environment within the country.
If at the beginning of 2020 it was still just an idea, then in 2025 the law turns into a full-fledged tool of everyday control. How is Russia developing its approaches to regulating Runet and are there any pitfalls for Russia itself?
Is it even realistic?
Russia’s decision to have a sovereign internet is more ideological and financial than a response to a real threat. A complete “lockdown” of the country is quite difficult to implement. The internet is highly decentralized. Although many companies like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and many other infrastructure companies are Western, there is no single “switch” that any of them could use. So, excluding Russia would require a global consensus and would involve the cooperation of many private players, which is extremely unlikely, as it would set a precedent that could destabilize the entire system. An example of this is ICANN’s negative response to Ukraine’s request to restrict Russia’s access to the world wide web after a large-scale invasion. Two reasons are given: ICANN is not the “world government of the internet” and does not have a centralized authority, and any other action by them would lead to a loss of confidence in the multilateral model. Therefore, the measures needed to support the global internet would no longer have support.
Russia is currently connected to the global Internet via backbone communications networks, which are large underwater and terrestrial fiber-optic cables that run through different regions of the country and connect it to the EU, China, and Central Asian countries.
The satellites available in Russia (the Yamal and Express series) are mainly used for telecommunications, government, and military communications. However, by 2027, Russia plans to launch a group of satellites aimed specifically at high-speed Internet into orbit. If we talk about cable sabotage, it is almost impossible to completely disable all communication networks, since the backbone infrastructure is represented by dozens of underwater and terrestrial routes through different regions. In order to completely "cut off" the country, all these cables must be disabled simultaneously.
An attempt can be made to block the satellite Internet using electronic warfare systems. Russia itself uses such systems, in particular the Tobol and Kalinka complexes. At the same time, their action is currently limited to local areas: for example, in 2024, GPS and satellite navigation signals were jammed in the Baltic Sea, and in Ukraine, cases of Starlink jamming in combat zones were recorded. Therefore, in order to completely block the satellite Internet on the territory of such a large country as Russia, it would be necessary to have many electronic warfare systems, since their radius of action is limited. In addition, satellite system operators can use countermeasures - changing frequency bands, algorithms and signal routes, which makes long-term and complete jamming an extremely difficult task. The development of a sovereign Runet for the Kremlin is a convenient tool of control. "Big Brother" monitored citizens back in the USSR, but modern technologies make this task easier. A national system of Internet traffic routing and the offer of domestic alternatives to Western services (such as Yandex instead of Google or RuTube instead of YouTube) help in more effective control, censorship and shaping of the narrative. Presenting this as a "defense against the threat from the West" makes it easier to justify censorship and promotes it as a mechanism of digital sovereignty, not repression.
A sovereign Internet means large government contracts for infrastructure, data centers, homegrown software and telecommunications equipment. This benefits state corporations and oligarchs who get lucrative projects. It also pushes users to domestic platforms, keeping advertising revenue and data within Russia. The country is also presented as "sovereign" as proof of its independence from Western technology and influence, similar to the rhetoric about energy or defense, which once again emphasizes the spread of the narrative of resistance to "Western hegemony" and the promotion of a multipolar world.
The evolution of isolation
Currently, Russia's transition to digital isolation can be divided into three stages:
2019–2020: Creation of legal and technical framework;
2021–2024: “dress rehearsals” of shutdown;
2025: Extinguished as the new norm.
The 2019 law established a mechanism for centralized management and the possibility of autonomous operation of the Russian segment of the Internet. It provided for state management of critical network infrastructure and the authority to unlock and filter. After that, requirements for providers were gradually introduced: the installation of deep traffic
analysis (DPI) equipment, developed by Rdp.ru, a Russian manufacturer owned by Rostelecom, is mandatory. Providers are also required to connect only through approved traffic exchange points and operate in a centralized system capable of blocking Internet traffic. The purpose of these actions is to create a mechanism for improved control over information flows, centralized network management and the possibility of isolating Runet. At the same time, Russia has begun testing whether the country is ready to isolate itself from the global network and whether traffic filtering equipment is working at all. The Russian Ministry of Communications and Telecommunications reported that the tests were successful and that the authorities are ready to ensure the smooth operation of the network. However, some Russian media outlets wrote that, according to the Ministry's presentation, based on the test results, a hypothetical attacker managed to successfully carry out 62.5 percent of attacks via the SS7 protocol and 5 percent of attacks via the Diameter protocol, which is a poor indicator. Thus, in 2020, four-stage "planned exercises to ensure the stable, secure and integrated functioning of the Internet and public communication networks in Russia" were held.
Even before the official adoption of the law on the "sovereign network", the Russian authorities practiced local attempts to unblock the Internet. For example, in July and August 2019, amid demonstrations related to regional elections, residents of some Moscow districts were briefly left without fixed and mobile Internet connections. However, a public demonstration of DPI capabilities took place on March 10, 2021, when Roskomnadzor announced that it would slow down Twitter (X) by 100 percent on mobile phones and by 50 percent on computers and laptops. The main reason was Twitter's refusal to remove more than 3,000 pieces of material deemed illegal by Russian authorities. Unlike previous inconsistent unblockings, this was implemented simultaneously on different networks by different providers.
A law prohibiting circumvention of blocks using VPNs has existed in Russia since 2017. In 2021-2022, Russia began using DPI technologies to block VPN services at the protocol level. Blocking "at the protocol level" means that authorities can recognize and block the connection method itself, even if the VPN service changes its address or masquerades. This is much more effective than simply adding the service's IP addresses to the list of banned sites that providers block at the request of the government. Shortly after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Roskomnadzor blocked access to the largest social networks - Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, after the government adopted a law criminalizing "fake" reports about the war. This was another step in isolating Russian society from independent sources of information and international media. In the following years, the authorities increasingly began to work out the technical possibilities of isolating Runet: from 2022 to 2024, regular interruptions in Internet access were recorded in various regions, which were explained by "technical work". But in fact, they were part of exercises in centralized traffic management via DPI equipment.
In 2025, this practice entered a new phase: Internet shutdowns have become a common means of control. In the Kursk region, where Ukrainian troops entered in the summer of 2024, mobile Internet was repeatedly turned off under the pretext of a "missile threat". Similar shutdowns have been used in other regions, in particular in Rostov-on-Don, which borders Ukraine and is a military and logistics center. Formally, these actions are explained by security needs, but in fact they serve to prevent information leaks and, in some regions, to suppress the coordination of protests. According to the "On the Line" project, which counts Russian Internet shutdowns, a new record was recorded in July - 2,099 Internet shutdowns. The project's authors also write that previously the shutdowns were precise - somewhere the Internet worked, and somewhere - not. However, in July, information appeared about the complete shutdown of mobile Internet in settlements. For example, in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, a complete absence of the Internet was recorded for five days. Thus, in 2025, closures have not become an exception, but a regular practice of the Kremlin.
September 1 - Ban Day
On September 1, a number of new repressive laws came into force in Russia. For example, a law came into force that for the first time criminalizes the very fact of searching for “extremist” materials, not just their distribution. Previously, liability was imposed only on those who created or distributed such content. In parallel, additional measures were adopted against the use of VPNs. Advertising or using VPNs that allow censorship circumvention is punishable by a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 rubles, depending on the status of the offender.
As usual, vague wording and technical control mechanisms (including the ability of Internet service providers or online platforms themselves to store users’ search history and transmit it to state authorities) open up a wide field for abuse of the law. Interestingly, even people loyal to the regime, including Ekaterina Mizulina, head of the Kremlin-linked Safe Internet League and a supporter of online censorship, have expressed concerns about the law. She warned that such regulations could harm even the activities of “control” organizations. Since, for example, about 30 percent of the League’s work is related to identifying extremist content and sending it to the authorities.
Another novelty was the ban on transferring SIM cards to third parties. Third parties are considered friends, colleagues, neighbors, but not yet close relatives.
“Exceptions are made only for persons listed in the Family Code: spouses, children, parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents and grandchildren,” explained Anton Nemkin, a member of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information Technologies and Communications.
However, Russians are still allowed to call someone or browse the Internet from their phones. The government explains such innovations by protecting citizens from fraudsters who often use dozens of SIM cards for criminal activities.
If the law on “extremist materials” shows how the state controls what people search for, and the law on SIM card transfer shows how the state wants to be present in who uses communication means and how, then the next step is to control where and how they communicate. This role should be filled by the new state messenger Max.
Max — a messenger that listens
The new state messenger, which will be forcibly installed on all new smartphones and tablets from September 1, according to the Kremlin's plan, should become a "national alternative" to WhatsApp and Telegram. To encourage users to switch, Roskomnadzor began blocking voice calls on WhatsApp and Telegram in August 2025. The FSB claims that all this is because Ukrainian special services use these messengers "to lure Russians into sabotage and terrorist acts." That is, people are actually forced to abandon their usual platforms and use Max, where all traffic passes through state-controlled servers.
This messenger is presented as a universal "superapp": it should combine all known messengers, as well as electronic government services and payments, which is very reminiscent of the Chinese WeChat, which has become not only a messenger, but also a digital passport and wallet at the same time. The application's privacy policy explicitly states that Max will not only collect data such as IP address or location, but also reserves the right to transfer it to third parties and state bodies.
A logical question may arise: what about VK? It seemed that the Kremlin already had its own social network, but there are several reasons why this does not satisfy the Russian authorities. VK is primarily a social network with a feed, groups and entertainment, while Max is designed specifically as a system application that comes with the phone and provides much more opportunities for centralized control. In addition, Max is a new project that the Kremlin presents as a symbol of “digital sovereignty” and “exit from dependence on the West”, while VK is still perceived as a commercial platform that grew out of private business and, even after being taken over by state structures, did not become an “official” channel of communication for Russians.
A double-edged sword
At first glance, a sovereign internet might seem like the ideal tool for the Kremlin: control over information flows, the rejection of “hostile” platforms, and complete visibility of citizens’ actions. But behind this picture lie many problems that plague Russia itself.
Knowing Russia’s long tradition of using cyberattacks to achieve political goals, a “sovereign internet” only helps other states more easily follow Russia’s trail. For example, it will be
possible to determine exactly through which channels Russian users receive information, and hackers and special services will be able to use this data. Since providers will work only through Russian servers, it will be easier for other states to determine that a cyberattack originates from Russia.
Mass shutdowns have already paralyzed online payments, banking services, deliveries, and even taxi calls from time to time. Companies operating on the internet live in a “suddenly they will be shut down again” mode. Even for investors and international partners sympathetic to Russia, this is a signal: the market is unstable and risky. No less noticeable is the technological lag. Russian developers are trying to create analogues of global services, but they are significantly inferior in quality. Max, conceived as a "Russian WeChat", so far looks more like a pale copy.
Ultimately, "sovereign" leads Russia into even deeper international isolation. Access to global knowledge, services and partnerships is decreasing, and the country itself is increasingly resembling a digital North Korea. So, instead of the promised "digital sovereignty", the Kremlin gets a boomerang: the ability of other countries to more easily track cyber attacks from Russia, economic losses and technological lag.