„Quo Vadis“ Belt and Road Initiative?

Beijing’s Response

For the Chinese leadership, the loss of image is unacceptable, which is why five years ago, in 2019, Beijing had already drawn its conclusions about the need for strategic changes in the BRI and the first steps were taken to calm Western criticism and concerns.

First, the number of countries that signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRI was sharply increased. The Chinese leadership’s goal is to weaken geopolitical concerns and Western criticism of the project. These memorandums have no binding legal force, and some countries receive little (South Korea) and others a lot (Pakistan).

Second, China has begun to implement a multilateral framework to a greater extent, such as the active participation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Xi Jinping’s important speech to the party and state apparatus on January 21, 2019, in which he stated the need to improve the initiative, initiated the trend of refocusing the BRI. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has evolved into a smaller number of projects but with greater strategic significance. For China, the BRI is increasingly becoming the core of foreign policy and economic diplomacy, and geopolitical consequences outweigh economic benefits for individual countries.

China has signaled understanding of the demands of the participating countries to adjust the BRI initiative, but not for its complete revision. A number of countries in Asia and Africa also have no intention of abandoning the initiative, as they do not want and cannot lose China as a partner. China has undertaken a tacit prioritization of BRI projects. Only some of them received financial support for non-commercial reasons from China’s political banks. The rest were forced to seek external partners, and some projects simply dropped out.

The BRI has retained its Chinese features, and Beijing has retained control over key projects, while leaving room for other developed countries to participate (the Republic of Korea, Europe). Of the major countries, only the United States and India have demonstrably distanced themselves from the BRI, although China is developing strong economic cooperation with these countries.

China has shown a willingness to compromise and share the benefits with other countries, but it has retained the non-Western model of the BRI, based on Chinese experience, as a fruit of Eastern civilization.

On a more concrete level, in view of the extremely high costs of the BRI, large state-owned enterprises in China have received formal instructions from the CCP leadership to focus more on profit than on strategic or political goals when planning overseas investments within the BRI. In addition, the CCP’s senior advisory group on the BRI made recommendations to increase the share of the private sector and commercial funds in investing in BRI projects. In this way, Beijing was trying to find a balance between the initiative’s lofty strategic goals and pragmatic management and control of resources.

Strategic changes

It is significant that recently the CCP’s People’s Daily has emphasized the “strategic determination” for the long-term continuation of the BRI, because, in general, “the opportunities outweigh the challenges.”

Beijing is based on the assessment that today the world is facing increasing unilateralism, protectionism, frequent local conflicts, and an increasing deficit of peace, development and security, instability and unpredictability. In this environment, according to Xi Jinping’s guiding principles, the high-quality development of the BRI must be based on the integration of high-quality development and high security: making use of advantages, avoiding pitfalls and traps; turning crises into opportunities; implementing proactive analysis and forecasting, and increasing adaptive capacity.

In recent discussions in the leading Chinese party bodies, the following principles are proposed in relation to the BRI:

– The principle of benefit for both parties in projects (win-win situation);

– Finding intersections in cooperation and interests;

– Coordinating large projects with “small but beautiful” projects;

– Not inciting big appetites and vain expectations;

Of paramount importance for Beijing is that China’s strategic interests must be followed in all cases. A key issue for the Chinese leadership is ensuring the security of China’s overseas interests. According to the new statements, in the coming period, increasing attention should be paid to improving peripheral security mechanisms and early warning mechanisms on a regular basis. China will continue to develop international cooperation in the field of security, while at the same time developing the “red line” thinking, monitoring and risk assessment will be carried out.

The Security Component – ​​The Invisible Part of the Iceberg

In addition to the visible, commercial component, the Belt and Road Initiative also has a second, invisible security component. It is focused on enforcing security cooperation with the BRI countries in order to protect Chinese interests abroad.

The importance of the implicit component of the BRI, related to security issues and the projection of Chinese military-political influence, is constantly growing. China is turning the BRI into a central instrument for expanding its global political and economic influence and penetrating the security sector. The transformation of Chinese economic presence into political influence and hence into intensive ties in the security sector is demonstrated especially in the case of Serbia. Of course, the transformation of investments into friendship is not automatic, but Beijing’s influence over Belgrade is sufficient for Serbia to take pro-Chinese positions in the international arena, especially in the important cases of sovereignty and human rights.

The deployment and implementation of the implicit part of the BRI strategic initiative are related to the projection of military power and security. The spread of Chinese companies around the world creates prerequisites, and even a justified need, for China to expand its military capacity to protect these investments and Chinese citizens. Under this pretext, China will internationalize its military forces and expand its external security capacity. China will continue to apply a combination of diplomatic and military measures in relation to important strategic projects.

Security challenges are increasing, as the central government in Beijing faces problems in coordinating and controlling projects. There is a mismatch and clash of group interests in China and abroad. In 2018, a special “Directorate for Ensuring the Protection of Chinese Interests in the BRI” was established in the Ministry of State Security (MSS) of China. The MDS leadership has intensified cooperation with the security services of those countries in which BRI projects are being implemented. Through this cooperation, tasks related to the physical security of infrastructure, energy and other facilities under construction and already completed are mainly solved. So far, there has been direct joint participation or independent organization of security activities abroad, mainly through Chinese private security companies, especially in African or Asian countries. In addition to providing information to protect Chinese investments and economic interests, Chinese efforts are increasingly directed towards conflict management and stabilization in BRI countries. Beijing regularly participates in multinational efforts, with more publicity and media attention, the motives being related to building an image of a responsible global power and the possibility of direct access and influence on local governments.

Impact of the war in Ukraine

Russia’s sudden and unprovoked aggression towards Ukraine has confirmed the correctness of the Beijing leadership’s focus on protecting China’s overseas interests. Chinese companies were already heavily investing in the Ukrainian ports of Chernomorsk and Yuzhny, but everything had to stop. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Sino-Ukrainian project to build a deep-sea port in Yevpatoria (Western Crimea) was suspended. In addition to China’s reluctance to indirectly recognize the annexation of Crimea, there are also environmental risks, as well as competition with the other four Crimean ports.

Russia plays a small role in the BRI, but China cannot implement its strategy against the will of the Kremlin, which has significant influence in the post-Soviet space and in Central Asia. As a major regional power, Russia cannot be just one of many participants in the BRI. However, it cannot allow Chinese companies to build with Chinese workers on its territory. Symbolic steps are being taken to connect the BRI land projects with the Eurasian Economic Union through free trade zones. There is a kind of “division of labor” in the Central Asian region – China has a strong economic role, and Russia is a security partner. However, Russia cannot protect Chinese investments, and China cannot rely on a foreign power in this regard. However, Russia and China will not allow their relationship in Central Asia to turn into a rivalry and make them vulnerable to the West.

Impact of conflicts in the Middle East

China’s interest in the Middle East is primarily related to securing access to the Mediterranean Sea. China’s increasing interest in this region is manifested by a series of Chinese projects in ports – Haifa, Piraeus, Port Said, as well as the large deep-sea port of Cherchell in Algeria. They also pave the way for China’s military presence in the region, which in recent years has been marked by China’s participation in military exercises and visits of warships in the Mediterranean Sea and in ports of European countries.

The current changes in Syria will not have a major impact on Beijing’s policy, since Syria is not a major investment target for China, nor is it a critical area for the protection of Chinese citizens abroad. Regardless of which forces take power in Damascus, they will inevitably rely on China for economic and social reconstruction. China’s strong infrastructure capabilities can help Syria quickly restart production and restore administration.

Although Syria is not of economic interest to China, it is of particular importance as an element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and China’s strategy to build a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea – an alternative land route to Europe via Russia, the Caucasus and Turkey. In addition, Beijing will seek to continue anti-terrorism cooperation with the new authorities in Damascus. The case of Afghanistan shows that Beijing is willing to maintain dynamic relations with Islamists, as long as its interests in Xinjiang are not affected. By offering humanitarian aid, China can establish good relations with the new Syrian government to further develop economic cooperation and infrastructure reconstruction projects.

Slow revival

Following the example of the United States in creating allies and dependencies through projects such as the construction of the Panama Canal and the Marshall Plan, China will seek to build a global network of Chinese investment, trade and influence through the BRI by 2049. Its scope starts from undeveloped and underdeveloped countries and expands to developing and developed countries, such as the BRICS members. This network already covers two-thirds of the planet’s population. The infrastructural modernization of the “Silk Road” is complemented by the “Digital Silk Road”, the “Medical Silk Road”, etc. The 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC should coincide with the goal of China’s long-term global leadership. It remains to be seen whether China will want to be a world hegemon like the United States.

CONCLUSION

China's Belt and Road Initiative, which started in 2013, aimed to connect Asia, Africa and Europe through land and sea routes. In this Initiative, China appears as a creditor, most often in infrastructure, and most of the jobs in countries where projects are carried out under the Belt and Road Initiative are done by Chinese companies that employ Chinese or foreign workers. Projects within the Belt and Road Initiative are implemented all over the world, including in the countries of the Western Balkans. In recent years, the Chinese authorities have been accused of pushing certain countries into a "debt trap" through the Belt and Road Initiative.
In general, the lending of infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative in the countries of the Western Balkans, but also around the world, is accompanied by a series of counter-traversals, starting with non-transparency, accusations of corruption, and the taking over of strategic facilities under Chinese management in a situation where the country is unable to repay the debt. We had such an example with Montenegro, which was unable to repay part of the loan for the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway section, and the public seriously considered the possibility of China taking over the Montenegrin port of Bar. In the end, with the intervention of European banks, Montenegro did not end up in " debt trap".
The text points out that the Belt and Road Initiative is, in fact, a platform that China is using to expand its geopolitical influence in the world.
In particular, attention is drawn to the fact that "China is turning the BRI into a central instrument for expanding its global political and economic influence and penetration into the security sector”, and the case of Serbia is cited as an illustrative example, through the fact that Serbia takes pro-Chinese positions on the international scene.
For China, the Belt and Road Initiative is a means of exercising and strengthening influence, but the countries in which the Initiative is implemented They can very easily find themselves in a position where, in exchange for "favorable" Chinese loans, they work against their own interests and in favor of Chinese interests.