OPINION: Expediting Prisoner of War Exchanges
Policies that put pressure on Putin’s authoritarian regime are key to hastening prisoner exchanges, not least providing captured enemy solders with exposure to a pro-freedom, pro-democracy education.
Free Azovstal protests are a common sight in Kyiv. It is easy to feel for the marchers and sign wavers seeking the return of family and friends from captivity in Russia. The credible reports of torture, sexual assault, and privation make for a mix of anger toward Russia and fear for the safety, health, and lives of loved ones. The long time waiting for their return brings a feeling of helplessness that can be temporarily quelled by protesting.
Unfortunately, the protests put political and emotional pressure on President Volodymyr Zelensky while likely hardening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s resolve to continue holding Azovstal and other Ukrainian Prisoners of War (POWs). President Zelensky must be attentive to public sentiment to a much greater degree than an autocrat like Putin. Ironically, protests in Ukraine probably serve to slow the pace of POW exchanges rather than hasten returns.
There are other practices that Ukraine can use that may hasten the exchange of POWs. The first is to institute a policy of first-in, first-out for POWs of both sides. The second is to provide POWs held by Ukraine with a pro-freedom, pro-democracy education while they are held as prisoners. These policies will put pressure on Putin to get Russian POWs returned as soon as possible.
Putin feels more pressure to get conscripts returned quickly than contract soldiers. Most conscripts were captured during incursions into Russia during the past few months. To secure their return, Russia will need to exchange POWs much more rapidly. This policy should have an exception that places POWs in need of medical care at the front of the queue but otherwise bring POWs home in the order in which they were captured. The Azovstal defenders and others captured in 2022 could be returned sooner under this policy.
Putin’s motivation for his war against Ukraine is based on his existential fear that freedom and democracy in Ukraine will undermine his regime in Russia. This fear can be used to further pressure Russia to speed up exchanges of POWs.
So, if Ukraine provides them with daily programming including movies, serials, music, news, commentary, books, and magazines that promote individual rights, democracy, good moral values, free markets, etc. then that should have a marked effect. Putin will not want them to be exposed to these ideas for a long time or in great detail. He will be concerned about their influence when they return to Russia.
Ukraine can reinforce this by using evangelical Christian chaplains in the facilities housing enemy POWs. Their influence on Russian POWs will add another deep concern to the Putin regime. South Korea has a sizable Christian population with a missionary culture. It would therefore be beneficial to invite some to serve the spiritual needs of the North Korean POWs.
Education in democracy, freedom, and individual rights, exposure to Christianity, and deeper knowledge of the wider world by North Korean POWs may become concerning enough to the North Korean leadership that they limit or end the involvement of their combat personnel against Ukraine. They may come to fear these ideas being brought back to North Korea even more than they are concerned about defections to South Korea or combat losses.
Protests may help family and friends to feel like they are doing something to get their loved ones home. Sometimes we all need to let emotion triumph over reason for a time. But policies that put pressure on Putin will have a greater chance of getting the Azovstal and other defenders of Ukraine returned sooner.