Give Me Your Poor — Russia’s Mercenary Foot Soldiers

Russia’s use of foreign mercenaries aims to sustain its war against Ukraine while avoiding a full mobilization of its citizenry.

Anecdotal evidence suggests foreign fighters are being used as cannon fodder, and there have been multiple instances of Russian commanders forcing foreign units to assault Ukrainian positions without the necessary equipment. 

At the same time, the Kremlin’s efforts to supplement its internal conscription have strained bilateral relations with countries otherwise sympathetic to Moscow. 

Offers of wages as high as $2,000 monthly have nonetheless proved an irresistible lure for many people from poorer countries, representing a 24-fold higher salary than the average in Nepal. There are no authoritative figures on the number of recruits, but while Nepali estimates of up to 15,000 appear high, an estimate in the low thousands may be reasonable. 

Russia’s hiring practices and its notorious indifference to troop welfare and survival have upset even allies like Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who asked Moscow last year to stop trying to recruit Serbs into the Russian military and Wagner Group via social media. Serbs serving in Ukraine have complained they are treated as wholly dispensable by Russian commanders.

Although estimates suggest the number of Serbs actively serving in Russia is low, likely in the dozens, Vučić’s at first sight seems a surprising rebuke for Russia from one of the few European nations forgo sanctions (although it may simply signify European Union and US behind-the-scenes pressure.)

Recruitment campaigns often extend beyond Europe and adopt criminal dimensions. Cubans recruited for construction projects, enticed by lucrative sign-on bonuses worth many times their monthly wages, have found themselves digging trenches in Eastern Ukraine, Reuters reported. 

In September, Cuba arrested 17 members of a human trafficking ring it said had helped identify, recruit, and transport men to fight in Ukraine. A Time magazine investigation noted passports used by the recruits were recently issued, suggesting an element of government awareness in a country where foreign travel is closely controlled.

Criminal prosecutors in Nepal charged a dozen people with acting as people smugglers for Russia, in a scheme that resembled the network in Cuba. Some 14 Nepalese citizens have died in Russia’s war against Ukraine, with 200 currently serving, according to Nepal’s Foreign Minister Narayan Prakash Saud. The Kremlin has so far ignored Nepalese requests to end recruitment, although it has held talks on the issue.

Current trends suggest foreign recruitment will continue well into the war’s third year. Ukraine’s National Resistance Center says Moscow has expanded its efforts into Africa. 

The increasing deployment of mercenaries resembles the way Russia recruited about 100,000 convicts with the promise of pardons in exchange for serving on the frontline. Both programs help shield the Russian people from the harsh realities of the war. 

Contemporary and historical cases of soldier mutinies and anti-war protests highlight the Kremlin’s need to insulate the public. During the First Chechen War, for example, mothers of Russian soldiers protested against the conflict, helping change public opinion and hasten its end. 

Mercenaries have also helped Russia delay further mobilization and avoid the resulting backlash. The first round sparked unrest and caused multiple attacks on recruiting stations and draft evasion. More than 800,000 men left the country rather than serve.

Keeping the war at arm’s length will be more difficult as Ukraine strikes deeper into Russian territory, making it ever more real to Russian civilians. A series of drone attacks on Russian refineries in February and March has underlined that Ukraine can make Russians feel at least some pain close to home.

Ukraine has appealed to poorer nations to act against the traffickers who lure young men to fight for Russia with promises of high pay. 

The US and its allies also have a wide array of tools to curb Russia’s recruitment operations. A strategic messaging campaign could be used to dissuade potential recruits from joining Russian mercenary organizations, highlighting the scams and schemes designed to lure unsuspecting individuals and displaying the horror of life on the frontline. 

US special operations commands, which already engage in strategic communications and information operations, could, for example, amplify news outlets, advocacy organizations, and think tanks that demonstrate the disparity between recruitment promises and reality.

The US and NATO can also coordinate with law enforcement agencies to dismantle criminal gangs participating in human trafficking. And there are some signs of progress; Nepal’s decision in January to halt all work permits for Russia marked a major step forward.

There needs to be greater efforts to improve transnational law enforcement cooperation between regional partners, including those unlikely to be receptive to US overtures. Cuba, for example, could work with other Latin American states, such as Colombia, which has become a net exporter of security, or Brazil, which has been attempting to balance relations between Washington and Moscow. 

Disrupting Russia’s recruitment campaigns would minimize the manpower at Putin’s disposal as he continues to seek others to pay the price of his illegal invasion. 

Sending outsiders to the frontline helps Putin distance the Russian people from the ramifications of his war, a key component of its continuation. If the flow is stopped, that distance will be harder to maintain.

William Mockapetris is a former Intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is also an M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies at the George Washington University.

Peter Roberto is the Program Assistant for the Transatlantic Defense and Security team at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in Diplomacy and International Relations from Seton Hall University.  

Oleksandr Seredyuk is an Intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He holds an M.A. degree in Comparative International Relations from Ca’Foscari University of Venice, Italy.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.