China on peace in Ukraine: What to expect based on the track record of Beijing’s narratives

With US President Donald Trump’s opening talks with Moscow on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, denying(opens in a new tab) Russia’s role as an aggressor, it more important than ever to scrutinise China’s own peace narrative on the “Ukraine crisis” (乌克兰危机). Understanding its alignment with Russian interests can help interpret Beijing’s position towards any potential outcome of US-Russia talks, and ensure that Europe is clear-eyed about what to expect from Beijing in that regard.

The issue is urgent as Beijing has already been ramping up messaging efforts towards Europe. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, Director of the Office of the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi tried to leverage the shift in Washington’s position and charm his European counterparts with calls(opens in a new tab) for “all parties and stakeholders directly involved” to participate in peace talks, emphasising the necessity of Europe’s involvement in any settlement. Yet soon after, President Xi Jinping spoke to Vladimir Putin on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, stating(opens in a new tab) that “China is pleased to see the positive efforts made by Russia and all parties concerned to defuse the crisis” (中方乐见俄罗斯及有关各方为化解危机作出积极努力).

Pinning down Beijing’s line can be helpful, as China’s efforts to present itself as a constructive actor are likely to intensify amid tensions between Europe and the US on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Especially as Beijing’s practical actions as the key enabler(opens in a new tab) of Moscow’s war machine have already been exemplified through “convincing evidence(opens in a new tab)” of China-based production of lethal drones for Russia, something which breaches Beijing’s own red lines, or the fact that around 70 percent of the machine tools, and 90 percent of the microelectronics Russia imports, which are crucial for maintaining military capabilities, come from China according to some estimations.

An analysis of Beijing’s high-profile statements on the war, and a review of 68 governmental statements issued between May 2024 (release of China-Brazil joint “six point consensus”) and December 2024, reveal a gap between rhetoric and substance. While Beijing emphasises “peace,” it offers no clear vision of how the resolution of the “conflict” should look. The so-called Chinese “peace proposal” narrative focuses instead on framing the ground rules of the “conflict’s” conduct, on blaming the West for sparking the “conflict” and enabling its continuation through support for Kyiv, as well as on legitimising Russia’s interests and concerns.

How has Beijing’s narrative evolved, what are its goals and how does its rhetoric relate to Russia’s position?

From shoulds to consensus: Evolution of China’s narrative on the war

From the start of Russia’s illegal war, China has always maintained that its position is “consistent(opens in a new tab),” “objective(opens in a new tab),” “rational(opens in a new tab)” and “impartial(opens in a new tab)”, as it seeks to play a “constructive role(opens in a new tab)” in what it calls the “Ukraine crisis(opens in a new tab)”, which it says was created by the US and its Western allies through the expansion of NATO, which threatened Russia’s security. Beijing maintains that the “crisis” lingers due to Western countries “pouring oil on the fire(opens in a new tab)” by providing Ukraine with arms.

But China’s messaging has actually not been static, and has evolved from effectively restating China’s perspective on general principles for international relations, through promoting China’s view on the conduct of the “conflict”, to promoting some vague principles for the “conflict’s” resolution in coordination with willing partners from the Global South.

While the “four musts”, first put forward in March 2022 (a few months later relabeled as the somewhat softer “four shoulds(opens in a new tab)”), largely repackaged China’s longstanding narratives on the conduct of international relations, Beijing’s much-discussed 12-point position paper “on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis(opens in a new tab)” (oftentimes mislabeled a peace plan) of February 2023 included a few more specific points on the conduct of the “conflict”. Building on this, in April 2024, President Xi Jinping introduced the “four principles(opens in a new tab)” to resolve the “Ukraine crisis”. However, despite what the name suggests, these principles, again, primarily outline rules for the conduct of the “conflict” rather than its resolution. They also include more distinct – albeit not explicit – jabs at Western countries than previous initiatives.

In May 2024, China cooperated with Brazil in jointly issuing a “six-point consensus” on the “political settlement of the Ukraine crisis(opens in a new tab)”, marking a shift in Beijing’s rhetoric regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by bringing in another actor to its narrative efforts. The consensus solidified China’s position on the conduct of the “conflict” and the broad framework for its resolution, and signaled China’s increased outreach to countries of the Global South. This last point was shown by Special Envoy Li Hui’s trips in May to August, and the establishment of the Group of Friends of Peace at the United Nations by the end of September, with a subsequent meeting in December 2024. While the group is promoted as open to all states, it primarily encompasses countries located in the Global South, and aims to “amplify stronger voices to contribute Global South countries’ efforts to promoting a ceasefire and achieving lasting peace(opens in a new tab)”.

Narratives as conflict management tools: The shield and the sword with Moscow in the background

An analysis of 68 Chinese government statements issued between May and December 2024 indicates that since the release of the China-Brazil joint consensus, Chinese government officials have come to particularly emphasise the three principles of de-escalation, the three elements of peace talks, and maintained that Chinese proposals enjoy the support of the international community, especially the countries of the Global South.

Beijing’s narrative continues to include few concrete proposals on how peace can be achieved. Instead, it serves two key purposes: a defensive ‘shield’ of blurring its support for Russia, and ensuring that the “conflict” does not escalate into a broader confrontation between geopolitical blocs, and an offensive ‘sword’ in the wider geopolitical competition with the US – all while opposing a peace that would be unfavourable to Russia and would risk bringing – from China’s perspective – an undesirable transition of power in Moscow.

By basing its position on vague principles that neither clearly endorse nor condemn either of the parties in the “conflict”, China has attempted to maintain a smokescreen for its support of Russia. However, closer inspection shows that China’s rhetoric on the war equates the interests of the victim – Ukraine – with those of the aggressor – Russia – by continuously approaching Russia’s demands as legitimate, expressed among others in the recurring(opens in a new tab) statement that the “legitimate security concerns of all states(opens in a new tab)” must be respected. Statements such as “The Russian and Ukrainian peoples live together on the same land and have created a common history(opens in a new tab)” reproduce Russian narratives and undermine Ukrainian perspective and agency.

So far, Russia has not officially endorsed any of the above Chinese initiatives, although Russian President Vladimir Putin(opens in a new tab) has spoken favourably of both the 12-point position paper as well as Xi’s four principles. Lack of Moscow’s full-throated, public support is likely desirable, as this would hinder Beijing’s attempts to present itself as an impartial actor in the “conflict”. Still, the principles underlying China’s initiatives align with Russia’s interests, clearly do not support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ten-point peace formula(opens in a new tab), and oppose Western principles articulated in the context of the war.

Regarding the more offensive ‘sword’, China’s narrative on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine serves Beijing in its wider geopolitical competition with the US. By criticising the use of unilateral sanctions and calling for unnamed actors to refrain from “putting oil in the fire(opens in a new tab)” and “avoid selfish gains”, China aims to discredit US activities related to the war. While China does not condemn Russia’s illegitimate violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, it does frequently condemn the West’s positions. For instance, MFA spokesperson Lin Jian on June 16 2024 accused(opens in a new tab) the United States’ “indiscriminate imposition of unilateral sanctions” of “seriously undermining the sovereignty and security of other countries, causing humanitarian tragedies and undermining the stability of production and supply chains”. NATO, on the other hand, should “reflect on the root causes of the crisis(opens in a new tab)”, and move away from its “Cold War thinking(opens in a new tab)”.

Chinese officials have also blamed Western countries for standing in the way of a resolution to the “conflict”, making references to the alleged near-agreement in Turkey shortly after the beginning of the war that was “obstructed(opens in a new tab)” by Western countries. In recent months, President Putin has increasingly emphasised(opens in a new tab) this point in his speeches, blaming Western states for the continuation of hostilities. Attempting to draw a direct comparison to the destructive and escalating US, China presents itself as “neither a creator nor a party to the crisis(opens in a new tab)” that – other than the US – also does not provide arms(opens in a new tab) to either party. Rather, it is an “impartial actor” whose peace proposals have found great support across the international community, especially among countries of the Global South(opens in a new tab).

Rhetoric that raises all boats?

Regularly highlighting that its proposals represent the “sincere will of the international community(opens in a new tab)” in pushing for a “political solution(opens in a new tab)” greatly helps China present itself as the voice of the Global South, a protector of its interests, and as a more responsible and stabilising actor than the US. While the China-Brazil consensus is first of all a bilateral initiative, Chinese officials do not tire of noting that it “has received positive responses from over 100 countries(opens in a new tab)”, that it “meets the common expectations of the majority of countries and is the largest common denominator in the world today(opens in a new tab)”.

Yet, the language of the joint proposal for peace negotiations has not been embraced in other formats, and has equally received only lukewarm responses from Ukraine and Russia. Even the BRICS group, of which both China and Brazil are founding members, made only a halfhearted statement in its most recent summit declaration that its member states “note with appreciation relevant proposals of mediation and good offices, aimed at a peaceful solution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy(opens in a new tab)”, not mentioning the China-Brazil proposal explicitly.

It is not possible to quantify accurately how effective China’s rhetoric is. The “positive reception” by other countries does not necessarily mean they share China’s view – they may be leveraging such endorsements for pursuing their own agenda in bilateral relations with China. But the fact stands that those countries feel no need to challenge Beijing’s messaging, leaving China the room to manoeuvre the war and to capitalise on the brand of “responsible stakeholder.”

China stops short of fully supporting Russia, but actively undermines peace efforts unfavourable to Moscow, such as snubbing the peace conference in Switzerland. Beijing’s narratives often align with Russia’s, blaming NATO and the US while advocating for the legitimacy of Russian claims. As ceasefire or peace talks loom amid the push for talks with Russia from the new US administration, China’s “peace” rhetoric should be viewed with caution, as Beijing continues to clearly lean to Moscow’s side. Europe needs to be prepared for China’s attempts to leverage the shift in Washington’s position to provide a smoke screen for the reality of where Beijing’s stands.