13.11.2025.

Beijing’s ‘Polar Push’: China’s Growing Influence in the Arctic

China’s strategic ambitions are increasingly focused on the Arctic, a region rich in resources and of political importance. This shift is aligned with the nation’s broader maritime aspirations articulated during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Beijing from October 16 to 22, 2022. In his report to the Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed, among other things, the importance of strengthening China’s maritime capabilities to safeguard national security and promote economic development.
 
This long-term vision reflects a growing recognition of the Arctic’s role in reshaping global dynamics. The melting ice caps are revealing rich opportunities for resource exploitation and shipping, particularly the Northern Sea Route. Recognizing these prospects, China has sought to establish a presence in the region, engaging in scientific research, infrastructure development, and diplomatic initiatives to secure its role as a major (quasi) Arctic actor.
 
China’s Arctic Strategy
 
China’s approach to the Arctic is a mix of political, economic, and scientific objectives. The establishment of research stations, such as the Yellow River Station in the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, demonstrates Beijing’s intention to contribute to polar science while solidifying its presence in the Arctic. These stations have allowed Chinese researchers to conduct studies on climate change and Arctic ecosystems, further justifying its foothold in a traditionally exclusive region.
In 2013, China was granted observer status in the Arctic Council, a significant milestone for a non-Arctic state. This status allows China to participate in discussions on Arctic governance, presenting itself as a cooperative partner while advancing its own strategic interests. Through this forum, Beijing has developed its image as a responsible actor, potentially positioning itself to influence future policymaking in the region.
Cooperation with Russia is another cornerstone of China’s Arctic strategy. The two countries have collaborated on the development of the Northern Sea Route (sometimes, perhaps boldly, called the Ice Silk Road). This partnership not only coincides with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, but also provides an alternative trade route to the Suez Canal, significantly reducing shipping times and costs between Asia and Europe. In addition to this logistical advantage, China has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure and resource exploitation projects, seeking to access the region’s vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals. The aggressive war in Ukraine has made Russia increasingly dependent on China, and the two countries are intensifying cooperation in the superpower competition for the key Arctic region.
 
As a result of the sanctions imposed due to the war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has become even more dependent on China. This new situation creates conditions for even closer cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic. This cooperation enabled China to gradually strengthen its presence in this part of the world. Russia has become China's main route to the Arctic region.
The increasing cooperation between China and Russia in the north is visible in many ways. Joint patrols of the Russian and Chinese coast guards were organized for the first time in the Arctic in the fall of 2024. These countries also organized joint military exercises in the Gulf of Finland.
Russia enjoys Chinese technological support and investments in energy projects in the Arctic region, where Chinese-Russian research cooperation has also intensified.
The Arctic region is a key arena for superpower competition, and China's growing presence in the region is likely to intensify this further. As an Arctic state, Finland will inevitably notice any changes in the local balance of power, according to a report by Finland's Intelligence and Security Agency SUPO.
The report also highlights that cooperation between China and Russia will have a wide range of implications for Finland. Russia views NATO as a direct threat, and China opposes all military alliances that include the United States. The Arctic region is important for the development, use, detection and countermeasures of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and for the associated strategic balance.
The risk that Western expertise and technology will reach Russia via China has also increased. Finland has a wide range of Arctic expertise that is of interest to both China and Russia. A detailed understanding of how to build icebreakers and other ice-strengthened vessels is just one example of this.
 
The Arctic is a key region for satellite and other technology
 
The Arctic region is strategically important for security, trade and technological reasons. We have long known that melting ice sheets will open up new sea routes and access to natural resources, such as minerals, gas and oil. As a superpower, China will seek to exploit these opportunities.
The Arctic region is equally important for satellite technology, as polar regions are ideal locations for ground stations. Many military and civilian positioning and communication systems rely on satellite technology.
 
While China has sought to establish ground stations in the Nordic region, these projects have drawn criticism from Finland and other Nordic countries. Finland has responded by requiring ground and radar stations to be subject to licensing. Current legislation also assesses licenses from a national security perspective.
 
China also understands that a superpower must have a navy capable of operating in any location, including Arctic conditions. China has long sought an independent Arctic operational capability and has invested in developing its icebreaker fleet accordingly.
 
Russia Needs China
 
Russia’s aggressive war has had a significant impact on the dynamics of the Arctic region. While this impact has included paralyzing the work of the Arctic Council, the most important change has been in the relationship between China and Russia.
Even 10 years ago, Russia was much more skeptical of Arctic cooperation with China, as it sought to maintain its dominant status in the region. Although China and Russia share similar goals, and their cooperation has been increasingly closer in recent years, the relationship remains characterized by distrust. China now has a stronger negotiating position in Arctic cooperation talks with Russia than it did before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Russian military industry relies heavily on technology imported from China, including microchips and various components. Russia is also increasingly economically dependent on China, as Chinese support allows Russia to continue its aggressive operations in Europe.
However, Russia should not be underestimated. Russia remains a stronger player in the Arctic region due to its long history, although it must now tolerate China more than before. It is indicative that Russia has more than fifty icebreakers, while China has only five.
 
Strengthening its Arctic presence is one of China’s goals.
 
China is pursuing a global military presence, and its interest in the Arctic is only part of a broader ambition in which the most important issue is superpower competition with the United States.
China benefits from securing a stronger partnership with Russia in countering the United States. It is seeking to strengthen the international structure.
It is clear that China’s ambitions regarding the Arctic extend beyond establishing its presence through research stations and observer status in the Arctic Council. One of the more significant aspects of its strategy is its efforts to leverage the expertise of Norwegian experts in Arctic technologies. Norway, as a prominent Arctic state, has developed advanced capabilities in deep-sea mining, offshore drilling, and cold-weather resource extraction. These skills are crucial for accessing the vast reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals hidden beneath the Arctic Ocean.
China has shown particular interest in cooperation that could facilitate knowledge transfer. The China-Norway Maritime Universities Consortium Alliance (CNMUCA), an academic partnership aimed at fostering cooperation between Norwegian and Chinese universities, is an example of Beijing’s intention to integrate into Arctic science and technology networks.
 
Although the details of the consortium have not been widely publicized, it indicates a methodical approach by China to advance its technical competence through bilateral cooperation. Moreover, Chinese investments in the Norwegian maritime industry signal a deeper alignment of economic interests. Through acquisitions and joint ventures, Beijing is seeking to access technologies that would otherwise not be available domestically.
 
Finally, China’s launch of the icebreaker research vessel Tan Suo San Hao in late 2024 reflects its possible aspirations to include Norway in joint Arctic expeditions. By demonstrating its commitment to scientific cooperation, Beijing aims to secure Norway’s support for its activities in the region. Such partnerships not only provide access to valuable data, but also support China’s claim to be a responsible and capable Arctic actor.
 
Promoting China's Ocean Governance Model
 
"Behind the scientific and economic initiatives lies a more ambitious goal: promoting a 'Chinese model' of ocean governance," the Articcenturi analysis states. It goes on to emphasize that in the Arctic, China is pushing for a governance model that includes non-Arctic states, such as China itself, viewing the region as a global good rather than an area exclusively controlled by Arctic nations.
Central to this model is the concept of win-win cooperation, which underscores China's push for multilateral frameworks that emphasize resource sharing and collective development. However, analysts argue that this approach hides underlying strategic goals, including securing resource rights and expanding political influence. By promoting its governance model, China is seeking not only to legitimize its Arctic activities, but also to counterbalance the overwhelming dominance of so-called Western powers in the region - this is due to the fact that of the eight Arctic states, seven are 'Western' nations and members of NATO, while Russia is the only one outside this bloc: institutionally, from a 'one state, one vote' perspective, the Arctic is indeed predominantly 'Western', regardless of population size, geographic area, or maritime borders.
In parallel, China has used soft power initiatives to reinforce its vision of inclusive governance. Through cultural exchanges, public diplomacy campaigns, and investments in Arctic states, Beijing has cultivated a narrative of mutual benefit and cooperation. However, this approach has faced resistance, particularly from the United States and its allies, who see China’s Arctic activities as part of a broader strategy to challenge Western hegemony.
 
CONCLUSION
 
China’s growing involvement in the Arctic is yet another testament to its ambitions to redefine its position on the global stage. Through scientific partnerships, infrastructure investments, and diplomatic maneuvers, Beijing has firmly embedded itself in a region of immense strategic importance. These actions go beyond resource exploitation and logistical gains, touching on broader themes of influence and governance.
 
By pushing for a governance framework that embraces non-Arctic nations, China is not only seeking inclusion, but also aiming to shape the rules of engagement to reflect its strategic interests. This approach challenges the dominance of established Arctic states and tests the limits of international cooperation. How China’s ambitions intersect with the sovereignty and priorities of Arctic nations will play a decisive role in the region’s evolution. The dynamics unfolding on this polar frontier deserve continued attention from policymakers and observers around the world.