What security guarantees does Ukraine need

 

The history of recent decades shows that recovery from large-scale wars is a complex, contradictory process that rarely leads to sustainable success. Many countries that have experienced major armed conflicts are characterized by institutional instability, economic vulnerability, internal political crises, and external threats.

Examples of successful post-war transformations - the classic "economic miracles" of Germany, Japan, and South Korea - are the result of a unique combination of external support, clear long-term strategies, and favorable international conditions. Examples of the opposite - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya - show how the lack of effective institutions and reliable security guarantees turns post-war recovery into a continuous series of crises.

In asymmetric wars, the survival of the weak is considered a victory - and often it really is. The fact that Ukraine will remain an independent state after the war with Russia gives hope for the future. However, to realize this hope, it will not be enough to hope for a miracle.

The post-war period will be a time of recovery and finding answers to complex challenges. Among the key ones are the issues of Ukraine’s security in the new geopolitical reality and the new international order. This will be a question not only of preventing new aggression, but also of the state’s ability to develop and maintain democratic institutions. Ukraine needs security guarantees that would create the most favorable environment for such tasks. The combination of three components - military capability, economic stability and international agreements - is of critical importance. EU membership, military cooperation and international cooperation at various levels are the basis of security guarantees for Ukraine in a broader sense, as well as the basis for any negotiations on ending the war. The potential of Ukraine’s EU membership is difficult to overestimate. Yes, Europe is not in the best shape now; and the EU is in many respects not what it was 20 years ago. But in the new geopolitical circumstances created by the war, Ukraine’s European integration takes on special significance as an element of security guarantees - for two reasons. First, any security model for Ukraine will require money: someone has to pay for security. You can count on support, but it is better to start from the worst possible scenario.

To be able to defend itself, Ukraine needs a stable and dynamic economy. After the war, the old economic model, designed for different geographical, demographic and international-political conditions, will not be enough. The new economy will need European markets and investments, its success will directly depend on rapprochement with the EU at all levels and will allow Ukraine to pay for its own security.

Secondly, the EU has a good framework for collective security. It is widely accepted that the Common Security and Foreign Policy is the EU’s weakest point, and this is true. Nevertheless, this policy provides for a wide range of joint actions in crisis management, peacekeeping, support for international security and opens up many opportunities for cooperation. In addition, Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, the so-called “Mutual Protection Article”, is a formalised obligation of EU Member States to jointly assist a victim of aggression by all available means in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

As is often the case with such obligations, they leave a lot of room for different interpretations and are unlikely to function automatically. But, nevertheless, such a formulation is not inferior to the well-known Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty. In addition to the letter of the Lisbon Treaty, there is also the spirit of the close link between the EU and NATO security formats and the fact that, by joining the EU, Ukraine will become a member of the Euro-Atlantic security community - even without NATO membership.

Economic opportunities are the basis for building a sustainable democracy and strong institutions. For Ukraine, they are vital, because the country's security after the war will cost a lot.

Not only does NATO membership remain unrealistic, but any agreements that would involve the participation of foreign troops on the side of Ukraine in the event of new aggression are extremely unlikely. Under these conditions, Ukraine will have to constantly think about strengthening its own deterrent potential, engage in the so-called "internal balancing". A large part of the country's GDP will be redistributed in favor of the security sector. In the absence of allies, it will be important for us to have access to arms supplies - diverse, in large quantities, preferably on preferential payment terms.

Permanent access to modern weapons and ammunition systems, joint production programs, intelligence exchange, participation in military exercises, and standardization of the armed forces according to NATO standards will become the basis of defense capabilities. Such partnership formats must be protected from political fluctuations. In other words, Ukraine must remain armed - it will be better for the entire European security architecture. This thesis would have sounded paradoxical 30 years ago, but Russian revisionism has changed a lot.

Ultimately, even without allied obligations, Ukraine should be free to develop those formats of international cooperation that strengthen its security. In addition to dialogue with NATO and European integration, agreements with influential and powerful countries - the USA, Germany, Great Britain, France, Poland - will also play an important role. Already signed agreements on security cooperation are unlikely to be enough after the end of the war, especially if Ukraine is left without NATO. The format of flexible armed cooperation with everyone will require deepening and clarifying this type of cooperation.

With prospects in the EU accession process, positive dynamics of economic development, access to weapons and broad cooperation with partners on security issues, Ukraine will be able to become more secure. These will not be security guarantees in the classical, narrow sense - as direct, unambiguous and formal obligations of others to protect us. Unfortunately, we probably won't get such guarantees. But this will be a way to reduce the likelihood of new aggression and build a stable and successful state.