SMMI in Kosovo: Digital Propaganda in an Institutional Vacuum
"Political paralysis in Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani's mandate is over, and thus the illusion of a functional system has finally been destroyed," is the title of an article published by the Russian platform Pravda, which was then amplified on other pro-Russian and pro-Serbian channels on Telegram.
This is just one of many cases that illustrate what is now known as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference FIMI. In a country like Kosovo, with its sensitive political history and occasional ethnic tensions, the influence of FIMI is multifaceted. It targets the general public, in addition to institutional actors, the media, and ethnic communities, mainly Serb.
These reports, and others that have intensified in recent months, use ideologically charged language, describing Kosovo as a “quasi-state,” and presenting the current situation as evidence of a failed system that cannot function without Western intervention.
This approach is in line with well-known pro-Kremlin propaganda narratives aimed at delegitimizing Kosovo’s statehood and undermining trust in democratic institutions. Topics such as the war in Ukraine, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, and anti-Western narratives are the main ones promoted by this network in the Balkan region, including Kosovo.
The attempt by the Russian “Pravda” to manipulate the Albanian public ends in failure due to the poor quality of the content and low visibility. Due to automated and grammatically incorrect translations, the texts are suspicious to readers, while their absence from key social platforms further limits their audience to a negligible number. Although its reach in the Albanian language is limited, the Russian platform “Pravda” has a significant impact on the Serbian community in Kosovo through content in the Serbian language. Of particular concern is the tactic of “Pravda” and similar channels to take over official data from Kosovo institutions and tendentiously turn it into disinformation, with the aim of deepening interethnic distrust.
One such case was recorded in the summer of 2025, when the Kosovo Police released a video of an arson attack in North Mitrovica in order to identify the perpetrator. However, this video was used by “Pravda” and several Telegram channels to spread unfounded claims and disinformation. Without any explanation, these channels presented the incident as a deliberate act by Albanians against Serbs, even speculating about the existence of victims. The rebroadcast video was not accompanied by a clear context, nor was it stated where exactly the event took place or who was the author of the video, which is a typical technique of public manipulation.
The rise of disinformation and calls for violence
The main narrative being promoted is the alleged ongoing repression of Serbs.
The entire process takes place through the systematic recycling of this content through media platforms and Telegram channels, which are the primary source of information for the Serbian community.
These posts become even more dangerous when they contain calls for violence and action. In recent weeks, several Telegram channels associated with pro-Russian and pro-Serbian nationalist narratives have published posts with a mobilizing and threatening tone. They attempt to link these threats to the political instability in Kosovo, especially after the failure to elect a new president, mentioning the possibility of escalating tensions. The posts attempt to impose a narrative that Kosovo is in a moment of political weakness.
The allusions to the “second part” of the terrorist attack in Banjska are even more disturbing.
The post with the phrase “Second half” together with the image of Milan Radoičić – the key figure behind the attack in Banjska – carries a frightening weight. Given that the wounds from one of the most serious security incidents in the post-war period are still open, this rhetoric is clearly interpreted as a warning of the continuation of the conflict. The problem further escalates in the comments section, where anonymous profiles openly call for radicalization and physical attacks. In this way, digital platforms cease to be just a source of news and are transformed into a dangerous tool for directly inciting violence on the ground.
Another post glorifies the figure of Željko Ražnatović – Arkan, leader of the paramilitary unit “Arkan’s Tigers”. Through nationalist songs and emotional lyrics about “revenge”, these contents revive the narratives of the wars of the 1990s, adapting them to the new digital reality.
Kremlin propaganda uses sophisticated methods to distort the truth about the war in Ukraine, often abusing the Kosovo case as a false historical parallel to manipulate international public opinion. “Pravda Polska” published an article claiming that there was a secret plan by the “Coalition of the Willing” for a direct invasion of Ukraine, allegedly in the same way that Kosovo was invaded in 1999.
By instrumentalizing the Kosovo issue, this disinformation attempts to reconstruct Russia’s role as a “victim” of a Western conspiracy. The main goal of this narrative is to obscure the reality on the ground and to relativize the fact that Moscow is the sole aggressor, whose actions began with the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalated into a full-scale military invasion in 2022. Events in other parts of the world are also used to fuel local narratives. Following tensions in the Middle East, various channels have called for Iran to attack the US military base “Bondsteel” in Kosovo. These announcements go beyond the framework of classic propaganda as they include technical details about missiles such as “Khoramshahr” or “Shahab”, creating the illusion of the feasibility of these threats. In essence, they aim to instill fear, delegitimize the international presence and present Kosovo as an area exposed to global conflicts.
Insufficient institutional response
Reports point to a combination of traditional media, social platforms and closed applications such as Telegram, where control and verification are much more difficult, and which are used extensively by Russia.
Reports from national security institutions also highlight the growing risk of hybrid interventions, including disinformation as an essential component.
However, the challenge remains to operationalize these assessments into concrete policies and effective response mechanisms. On paper, Kosovo has taken some steps to address FIMI. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Kosovo Police have increased surveillance of the digital space, especially in cases related to direct security threats.
Along with Serbia, government documents qualify Russia as one of the main actors with a hostile approach towards Kosovo, which is trying to interfere in various forms. Thus, the Kosovo Security Strategy 2022-2027 states that, due to its geographical location, history and current political reality, which includes the lack of membership in key regional and international organizations, Kosovo is constantly exposed to hostile political and intelligence activities of foreign state and non-state actors who are trying to undermine the national interests, aspirations and Euro-Atlantic orientation of Kosovo. The goal of these actors is internal stability, economic development, the defense and security sector, with the aim not only of collecting information, but also of creating confusion through disinformation, inciting divisions, unrest and interethnic conflicts.
Another document dealing with cybersecurity defines disinformation as the intentional dissemination of false or misleading information with the aim of influencing the opinions, attitudes and actions of individuals. In this document, the Kosovo government commits to creating a system for research and development projects that include and go beyond the scope of traditional cybersecurity, in order to understand existing and potential threats, including cyberstalking, hate speech and disinformation.
In addition to the legal infrastructure, Kosovo aims to respond to this phenomenon with the help of other states. In June 2024, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the US Government and Kosovo against the manipulation of information by foreign states. The Memorandum signals a commitment to developing a common approach, better understanding disinformation by foreign actors and building consultative mechanisms to respond to threats.
The Nordic perspective on combating disinformation and strengthening social resilience is another example that should be applied in Kosovo, as noted at the conference held on 15 April 2026 on the topic: “Resilient Democracies in the Information Age”. In this regard, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Glauk Konjufca, stated that work is being done to strengthen inter-institutional communication with other actors in the fight against disinformation, which, according to him, comes mainly from Russia and Serbia.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kosovo sided with the West in imposing sanctions on Moscow, which included banning platforms that spread disinformation, such as “Sputnik” or “Russia Today”.
Harmonization with EU Directives
At a strategic level, efforts are being made to align domestic policies with those of the European Union. However, unlike some EU countries that have dedicated structures for FIMI, Kosovo still does not have a centralized unit that deals exclusively with this phenomenon.
This lack of institutional coordination is often reflected in fragmented responses. For example, while one institution may identify disinformation campaigns, there is no clear mechanism for addressing them in a coordinated manner with other institutions and the public.
There are also other challenges in monitoring official communication channels, as Kosovo lacks a legal framework regulating the presence of public institutions on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram or TikTok. In addition, due to limited participation in international mechanisms, Kosovo does not have its own “URL” code, which leads to some online platforms operating through addresses registered outside the country.
The European Union has made numerous efforts to combat disinformation through initiatives such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Action Plan against Disinformation. This Act is considered the most important EU regulation aimed at combating disinformation, in particular Russian campaigns that reached more than 165 million users in the EU in 2023.
In addition, the Rapid Alert System and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) are key to monitoring and responding to disinformation across Europe, including the Balkans.
A large number of analyses suggest that the European Union should not limit itself to implementing directives. As the Clingendael Institute report emphasizes, the EU’s approach must be tailored to the specific political realities of each country in the region. Disinformation in the Balkans is not just a media problem, but part of a broader geopolitical challenge that includes cyberattacks and foreign interference.
The ongoing battle
Confronted with this reality, Kosovo should consider creating a national strategy to combat FIMI, which would include inter-institutional and extra-institutional coordination, as well as cooperation with international partners. It is also necessary to establish a specialized unit to monitor, analyze and respond to disinformation campaigns in real time.
Likewise, cooperation with digital platforms is essential. Although this is a global challenge, Kosovo can benefit from the experiences of other countries and the initiatives of the European Union in this area.
Numerous examples show that FIMI in Kosovo is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader geopolitical strategy. From narratives that delegitimize statehood, to calls for violence and manipulation of global events – this is a battle that is fought daily in the digital space. Therefore, the response to it cannot be partial or merely reactive. A coordinated, sustainable approach based on cooperation between institutions, media and civil society is needed.
In the institutional vacuum, media and civil society organizations play a major role, developing fact-checking mechanisms and narrative analysis to contribute to raising public awareness. However, their impact often remains limited given the scale and speed of the spread of disinformation.
Ultimately, investing in media and digital literacy must be a long-term priority. Without this, any effort to combat disinformation will be insufficient.
Fitim Gashi
Since 2013, Fitim Gashi has been a long-time journalist at KOHA Group, covering political, social and judicial issues in Kosovo. Gashi has 16 years of journalism experience, and previously worked for "Kosova Sot", "Tribuna", "Lajm". For his work, Gashi has been awarded several awards from domestic and international organizations. He has also participated in many international programs for the promotion and improvement of professional journalism. Gashi holds a master's degree in political science and public administration.