Sanctions in exchange for political prisoners: What game is Russia playing?

Russia opens a new front for negotiations with the US

The Kremlin rejected a deal that no one had yet officially offered it—and rejected it in a way that left the door open. On September 29, *The Atlantic* reported that Trump supports the idea proposed by his envoy, John Cole: Moscow releases political prisoners, and Washington eases sanctions in return. There is no need to wait for the war to end for this to happen.

The next day, Peskov responded that the issue is not being discussed "in the current climate" because there are no political prisoners in Russia. (The organization "Memorial" counts 1,826 of them.) Peskov then added, however, that the two countries' intelligence agencies maintain regular contact regarding prisoner exchanges. They rejected the rhetoric, not the bargaining itself.

This scheme was not devised specifically for Russia; Cole, a former lawyer for Trump, had been working on it in Minsk for over a year. If one counts those already released, the results are impressive: around 500 people, including Americans. In mid-September, Lukashenko released another 25 prisoners, and the US lifted sanctions on Lakokraska and Bellesbumprom that same day. Yet, there is another figure to consider: according to Viasna, 912 political prisoners remain in Belarusian jails.

Arrests continue: Viktor Babarikin, a lawyer, was recently sentenced to three years. Tikhanovskaya welcomes every release while reiterating a simple fact: Lukashenko has no intention of letting everyone go.

That is how the conveyor belt works. At the intake end, an arrest that costs the regime nothing; at the output end, a release that triggers the lifting of sanctions. As long as the intake remains open, the belt keeps moving, and each batch released simply makes room for the next.

For Minsk, this conveyor involves potash, the airline, and the paint factory. For Moscow, discussions are already underway regarding oil, diesel, and rare-earth metals. One of the negotiators explained to *The Atlantic* what Trump’s team is counting on.

"They believe in the magic of business. They think that if these deals are struck, the Russians won't revert to militarism."

It is hard to revert to militarism if one never abandoned it in the first place. Russia is currently at war, and every dollar added to its oil revenues will flow into the budget that pays for "Shahed" drones. Diesel is a completely different story on this list: it is precisely what Ukrainian drones are destroying at Russian refineries, and it is precisely what Trump has been asking Zelensky about since mid-September.

Zelenskyy responded via the same journalist for *The Atlantic*: Ukraine will attempt to block any easing of sanctions until the war ends. He also acknowledged that influencing Washington would not be easy. The sobering reality is that the U.S. President can lift American sanctions without consulting his allies.

However, Washington now has a safeguard in place that did not exist a month ago. The Graham Act, signed on September 18, enshrined these sanctions into law. The President can waive them, but only by submitting a written justification to Congress stating that doing so is in the national interest of the United States. That same Congress passed the bill with 86 votes in favor and 11 against in the Senate, and 262 votes against in the House of Representatives.

With the November 3 election just a month away, explaining to him why easing sanctions on Putin serves U.S. interests would hand his opponents ready-made ammunition. Whether the administration would dare sign such a document before the election remains an open question.

Meanwhile, Cole has received a new assignment: the White House has nominated him as Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs. It is a position right on the assembly line.

Securing the release of anyone from a Russian prison is a positive development—something no one would dispute. For Ukraine, however, the mechanics of this story matter: if sanctions begin to be traded for people, the Kremlin will gain a way to secure sanctions relief—a process it can simply replenish through further arrests. Therefore, Ukraine's task in Washington is now singular: to ensure that any easing of sanctions passes through Congress and is tied to a ceasefire, rather than to the next group of released individuals.