Is Ukraine’s Next Target to Shut Down Russia’s Commercial Airspace?
A new tactic that Ukraine may employ, which could be described as a “strategy to disrupt Russian commercial air transport through drone attacks”, paves the way for new developments that could prompt foreign airlines operating commercial flights to Russia to reassess the safety of their flights within Russian airspace.
Ukraine’s New Strategy in the War: Disrupting Russian Commercial Air Transport with Drone Attacks
In the war between Ukraine and Russia, which has been ongoing for over four years, the intensity of drone-based combat – whose role as a game-changer cannot be denied – continues to escalate. In this context, an article published in *The Wall Street Journal* on 3 September raised the possibility of a new development that could alter the course of the war. The main focus of the article is Ukraine’s introduction of a new tactic involving the use of drone swarms. “The core strategy of disrupting Russian commercial air transport through drone attacks” – this new tactic, which could be described in these terms, paves the way for new developments that may cause foreign airlines operating commercial flights to Russia to reassess the safety of their flights within Russian airspace.
Ukraine’s move to close off Russian commercial airspace aims, rather than directly shooting down aircraft, to use civil aviation security protocols and insurance mechanisms as leverage, by cornering Russia, thereby forcing the country to close its own airspace of its own accord on the grounds of “flight safety”. The aim is to sever Russia’s air links with the outside world by disrupting civil air traffic. With this strategy, the aim is for Russia to now experience a situation similar to that which has already led commercial airlines to suspend flights to Ukraine until the war ends – a situation where, due to Russian airspace being virtually closed off as a result of Russian attacks, commercial airlines have deemed passenger transport to Ukrainian airports unsafe.
Within the framework of this “core strategy of disrupting Russian commercial air transport through drone attacks”, it is necessary to examine the technical and tactical requirements highlighted by the Wall Street Journal, the support Ukraine must secure from Western countries for this purpose, and the potential defence and retaliation capabilities Russia might develop in response to this strategy.
Methods, Technology and Tactics: How Can Russian Airspace Be Paralysed?
First and foremost, we must emphasise the following: Ukraine’s ultimate aim is not to shoot down Russian passenger aircraft, but to render the skies ‘unacceptably risky’ for commercial flights. To address this, the Russian civil aviation authority and airport operators must work in conjunction with commercial airlines to implement emergency action and evacuation plans against drone attacks. For example, at Sheremetyevo International Airport (SVO) , when Ukrainian armed drones launch swarm attacks from the air, this airport must be closed in accordance with Russian civil aviation regulations, and aircraft in the air must be diverted to the nearest suitable and safe airports. Under Russian regulations, when an unidentified object (such as swarms of drones) is detected in airspace, the ‘Closure Plan’ is immediately activated at airports in the region.
In the specific case of Moscow Airport, this leads to a complete halt in take-offs and landings at the airport, with aircraft being diverted to other airports. Ukraine will trigger the activation of the “Closure Plan” protocol by the Russians by sending waves of small, inexpensive drones to major hubs such as Moscow (Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo, Vnukovo, Zhukovsky), St Petersburg and Sochi. Consequently, by sustaining such drone attacks on a 24/7 basis—continuously and erratically—Ukraine could bring about the automatic closure of specific sectors of Russian airspace.
In this context, the international air transport insurance mechanism will be adversely affected by this new “unsafe” situation arising in Russian airspace. Should a region be declared a ‘war risk zone’, international insurance companies (such as Lloyd’s) would cancel the cover for aircraft using that airspace; alternatively, this could result in airlines facing the same problem of having to pay high insurance premiums as is currently the case in maritime transport following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Ukraine could launch a propaganda campaign to convince foreign airlines (from China, Turkey, Germany, the Gulf states, France, etc.) to voluntarily cancel their flights to Russia by launching a propaganda campaign claiming that Russian airspace is no longer safe for commercial flights.
Furthermore, Ukraine could render Russian airspace as unusable as possible by employing technical methods such as Air Traffic Control (ATC) signal jamming and spoofing. It is not just physical drones; by deceiving Russia’s civil aviation radars and GNSS/GPS navigation systems through electronic warfare (EW), Ukraine could disrupt instrument landings, GPS-aided landings and similar procedures for civilian aircraft approaching airport runways. It could make landings at Russian airports appear ‘unsafe’ in the eyes of the world. In line with this approach, Ukrainian drones could carry out precision strikes against the terminal and fuel service infrastructure at Russian airports. By striking airport runways, control towers, radars and, most importantly, the aircraft fuel storage facilities (depots/refineries) that supply the airports, they could disrupt operational continuity. Ukraine may aim to cause commercial aircraft owned by foreign companies to be stranded at Russian airports for days due to the infrastructure problems that would arise following such attacks.
What Support Might Ukraine Receive from Western Countries in Line with This Strategy?
I would say that, from a technical perspective, it would be quite difficult for Ukraine to carry out an operation of this scale entirely on its own. On the other hand, I believe that, thanks to the technical support likely to be provided by its Western allies, Ukraine will have no difficulty in implementing this drone attack strategy.
First and foremost, Ukraine will require comprehensive Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting support. To this end, British (RC-135 Rivet Joint) and American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, drones and satellites patrolling the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea can transmit the positions, ‘blind spots’ and deployments of Russian air defence and air traffic control radars to Ukraine in real time. Ukrainian drone swarms could carry out infiltration operations towards Russian airfields in waves, utilising identified safe blind spots and routes.
Similarly, electronic warfare and software support could be provided to Ukraine by the UK, France and Germany, and possibly the US. With the support of AI-based “autonomous visual navigation” (similar to Terrain Contour Matching – TERCOM) algorithms and GPS-independent flight software—which enable Ukrainian drones to overcome Russian electronic warfare jamming—it becomes feasible for them to easily reach airfields deep within Russian territory.
Furthermore, the financial, logistical, parts and component contributions from British and European defence industry firms are crucial for the procurement of the engines, composite materials and avionics components required for the production of Ukrainian-made long-range (1,000+ km) kamikaze drones such as the Lyutyi and Bober. With the support provided by the Western world in the form of Long-Range Drone Technology and Component Supply, the cost-effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone production infrastructure is being enhanced, saving the country time in its production processes and continuing to enable rapid production. Given the new drone attack strategy planned for Russian airports, Ukraine requires the production of a greater number of drones in addition to the existing ones; however, Ukraine’s resources alone are insufficient to support such a vast production range.
One of the key pillars of this drone attack strategy is the strategic communications and propaganda warfare component. By exaggerating Ukraine’s attacks, in a manner that would invalidate Russia’s claims that its ‘airspace is safe for commercial flights’, this could trigger diplomatic pressure from the Western bloc, led by the UK, via international aviation rating organisations to declare Russian airspace a ‘red zone’.
How Can Russia Prevent Drone Attacks on Its Airports?
Given Russia’s vast territory, it is impossible to protect every square kilometre. However, it would be naive to think that a superpower like Russia—which possesses the world’s second-largest defence industry infrastructure and a capable military—would be left helpless in the face of Ukrainian drone attacks.
First and foremost, Russia will recognise the need to deploy a layered and comprehensive air defence system around its airports. However, long-range missile defence systems such as the S-400 and S-300 are not effective against drones; or rather, the cost of the measures these systems would provide is extremely high. For this reason, Russia may opt to establish a dense point-defence line by deploying Pantsir-S1, Tor-M2 and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns around its strategic airports. This situation would result in some of these point air defence weapons being withdrawn from the Ukrainian front to protect critical Russian airfields against Ukrainian drone attacks. Should Russia adopt this approach, Russian forces on the Ukrainian front would find themselves increasingly unable to defend themselves against Ukrainian drones. The Russian General Staff is under pressure to adopt new measures that will protect the airfields without leaving the front line unguarded.
Russia will once again resort to Widespread Electronic Suppression (GPS Jamming). In particular, it could completely block global positioning signals around all major cities and airports. However, as this would also make navigation difficult for Russian civilian aircraft, it could leave the Russian military authorities facing what we might call a ‘double-edged sword’ strategic dilemma.