01.09.2025.

Georgia – a strategic outlier in Russia’s regional retreat

Once hailed as a beacon of democracy and the world’s top reformer, Georgia stood at the forefront of the post-Soviet transformation. It was the first country in the region to pursue deep institutional reforms, shed authoritarian legacies and commit to a Euroatlantic future. For two decades, its foreign policy orientation was unambiguously anchored in aspirations for European Union and NATO membership.

Today, as Russian influence recedes, Georgia has become a striking geopolitical outlier. The Kremlin is overextended in Ukraine, diplomatically diminished in the Middle East and strategically weakened in the South Caucasus. Armenia and Azerbaijan are pursuing peace and distancing themselves from Moscow. Meanwhile, Georgia is drifting in the opposite direction, aligning politically with Russia and expanding ties with China and Iran.

This reversal is consequential. Georgia sits on the Black Sea, at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and along the Middle Corridor linking China to Europe. Its transformation from reform leader to authoritarian outlier challenges Western influence in a contested region and offers Moscow one of its last remaining footholds amid broader decline. The geopolitical costs of this shift extend beyond Georgia’s borders, undermining EU and NATO credibility in the Black Sea region and weakening the West’s strategic position in Eurasia.

How Georgia deviated from its Western trajectory

Georgia’s democratic reversal began with the 2012 rise of Georgian Dream, a party backed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. The reclusive oligarch, who made his fortune in Kremlin-linked Russian networks, briefly served as prime minister from October 2012 until his resignation in November 2013. Despite stepping down from the premiership, Mr. Ivanishvili has remained Georgia’s de facto ruler. This political shift followed the 2008 Russian invasion, which left Georgia geopolitically exposed and without any clear path to NATO or the EU. Western inaction created space for creeping state capture by Russian proxies.

While officially committed to Euroatlantic integration, Georgian Dream steadily dismantled democratic institutions, capturing the judiciary, politicizing law enforcement and suppressing media and civil society. The result was the near-total capture of the state.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a clear turning point. For Georgian Dream, strategic ambiguity was no longer sustainable. Supporting Ukraine would have signaled full alignment with the West and overt defiance of Moscow. Instead, the government opted for silence, abstaining from sanctions and distancing itself from the international coalition. This was not merely a diplomatic hedge; it was a calculated political decision to preserve domestic control and avoid antagonizing Russia.

Georgia became a hub for indirect sanctions evasion. Dual-use goods began to be re-exported to Russia through Georgian intermediaries, alarming Brussels and Washington. Meanwhile, Georgian Dream welcomed most Russian migrants but blocked anti-Kremlin voices. This selective hospitality signaled quiet compliance with Moscow, in stark contrast with Georgia’s past defiance.

The war in Ukraine revived momentum for EU enlargement. For the first time, the union explicitly considered Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as candidates for membership. In Kyiv and Chisinau, this was seen as a strategic opportunity. In Tbilisi, it was viewed as a threat.

Meeting EU conditions on judicial reform, anti-corruption and media freedom would have required reversing a decade of authoritarian consolidation. Georgian Dream instead escalated repression, reviving the “foreign agent” law, targeting NGOs, jailing opposition figures and violently cracking down on protests. Still, the EU granted Georgia candidate status in late 2023, not as an endorsement of the ruling party, but as a signal to the Georgian people that their European future was still within reach. It was a last-ditch attempt to preserve a strategic relationship.

A crisis of legitimacy

The situation deteriorated further after the October 2024 local elections, which were widely criticized as fraudulent. International observers raised serious concerns, and Western officials withheld recognition of the results. Brussels responded by suspending accession talks and warned of targeted sanctions.

Protests have since become a daily feature of Georgian life, often led by youth movements and former civil society leaders. Opposition figures remain imprisoned, journalists are threatened or exiled and public trust in state institutions has collapsed. Georgian Dream has doubled down on purging moderates, proposing restrictive constitutional changes and further tightening control over electoral processes and the media.

Georgian Dream’s claimed neutrality aligns with Russian foreign policy

Georgia’s relationship with the EU and NATO is rapidly deteriorating. NATO summits in 2023 and 2024 omitted Georgia entirely from final communiques, marking a significant departure from earlier strategic language. EU-Georgia cooperation has stalled.

In July, 19 EU foreign ministers published a joint statement calling Georgia’s trajectory “anti-European” and “authoritarian,” warning that continued backsliding would carry consequences. As a final warning, the EU issued an eight-point ultimatum demanding the repeal of legislation targeting civil society and minority rights, as well as meaningful anti-corruption reforms. The European Commission has made clear that Georgia’s visa-free regime, granted in 2017 and long seen as a tangible benefit of EU integration, may be suspended if progress is not made by the end of August.

While visa-free access for ordinary citizens remains in place for now, it has already been revoked for diplomatic and service passport holders. Several EU capitals, including Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn, have imposed unilateral entry bans on Georgian Dream officials. The European Parliament, in its July resolution, declared Georgia’s EU path “effectively suspended” and denounced the October 2024 elections as “rigged.” It recommended personal sanctions on top Georgian Dream leadership, affiliated business networks and senior figures in the judiciary and security services.

U.S. policy: Congressional pressure, executive restraint

The second Trump administration has retained key elements of the critical posture established under former President Joe Biden. Sanctions on Mr. Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream-affiliated judges remain in place. The MEGOBARI Act, which mandates scrutiny and potential sanctions for democratic erosion enabling new sanctions on those involved in democratic erosion and foreign alignment with authoritarian states, passed the House of Representatives in May but remains stalled in the Senate.

Georgian Dream has lashed out at the legislation, accusing Washington of interference. Despite efforts to curry favor with Trump-aligned figures, such as echoing anti “deep state” rhetoric and engaging with conservative commentators, no substantive shift in the United States executive policy has materialized.

More on the South Caucasus

The lack of executive clarity has undercut Washington’s leverage, even as bipartisan concern in Congress continues to grow. The result is a fragmented U.S. response, symbolically supportive of democratic forces but lacking in enforcement. Former Ambassador Kelly Degnan’s final assessment was unequivocal: Georgia, once seen as a regional success story, now risks becoming “strategically irrelevant” to U.S. policy.

Growing alignment with China

Georgia has deepened ties with China. In 2024, it became the first country in the region to sign a mutual visa-free agreement with Beijing. That same year, its National Bank entered cooperation with China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, raising alarms over potential financial sanctions evasion.

Bilateral trade reached $1.9 billion in 2024, and new agreements expanded cooperation on infrastructure, digital connectivity and direct flights. While framed as diversification, the scale of the relationship suggests growing geopolitical alignment. Beijing sees Georgia not just as a trade partner, but as a strategic outpost along the Middle Corridor.

Engagement with Iran

Georgia has also revitalized ties with Iran. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze visited Tehran twice in 2024, once for the funeral of President Ebrahim Raisi and again for the inauguration of his successor, attended by figures such as Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

Georgian government officials also participated in a memorial for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers killed by Israeli strikes. The Georgian foreign ministry issued muted statements on regional tensions, declining to align with Western positions.

Scenarios

Likely: Entrenched authoritarianism and managed isolation

Under this scenario, Georgia shifts to authoritarian rule and aligns with Russia. Georgian Dream stays in power after the October 2025 local elections, with the next parliamentary vote not due until 2028. EU accession talks remain frozen. Georgia sustains only minimal functional ties with the West, focused on trade and border security, while deepening engagement with China and regional powers. Russia remains a silent but strategic partner, benefiting from Georgia’s alignment without overt involvement.

The EU revokes Georgia’s visa-free regime after the August 31 deadline. Anticipating unrest, Georgian Dream intensifies its crackdown on opposition, media and civil society. A new financial crimes law gives the authorities broad powers to freeze assets, restrict movement and pressure critics. Georgian Dream also uses the Orthodox Church to cast EU demands as threats to traditional values, diverting focus from the visa issue.

In the U.S., the MEGOBARI Act may be revisited in early fall, but the delayed timing would blunt its impact. In Georgia, even with a broad election boycott, dissent remains divided and two opposition parties still plan to take part.

Somewhat likely: Public backlash and strategic recalibration

Two diverging outcomes of public protest are plausible depending on the international response, especially from the EU and the U.S.

One possibility is that the EU suspends visa-free travel. People protest but Georgian Dream cracks down with force. Demonstrations are met with arrests, media restrictions and emergency powers. Georgia begins to resemble a Belarus-style regime, closed politically, but economically pragmatic, with ties to China, Turkiye and the Gulf region.

In this scenario, relations with the West become strategically hollowed out, with Georgia relegated to the periphery of the European project.

Another possibility is for the visa suspension to be coupled with the implementation of the MEGOBARI Act. Facing personal sanctions, Georgian Dream treads more carefully. Domestic opposition regroups. Georgia stabilizes as a managed hybrid regime, still authoritarian, but with limited space for civil society and future Western reengagement. While a democratic transition through elections remains unlikely in the near term, this scenario preserves a degree of Western engagement, leaves the door open for future course correction and reduces the risk of irreversible authoritarian entrenchment.

Low-probability, high-impact scenario: Russian escalation and regime survival

In a less likely but high-impact scenario, a Ukrainian breakthrough in its war with Russia intensifies pressure on the Kremlin to preserve its remaining influence in the region. The psychological effect of Russian defeat (military or diplomatic) would have a ripple effect, emboldening both the opposition and broader civil society. With public protests mounting and Georgian Dream’s internal control cracking, Georgia could become a tempting target for Moscow to reassert strategic relevance.

Rather than launching a large-scale military operation, Russia exploits this momentum through limited provocations, engineered border incidents, false flag operations or localized confrontations carried out in tacit coordination with Georgian Dream-aligned security elements. The goal would be to create just enough instability to justify emergency powers, derail domestic mobilization and reinforce Russia’s role as a regional security actor without triggering full-scale conflict.

Such a move would send a coercive signal to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkiye, deterring further realignment away from Moscow. For the West, it would present a familiar dilemma – act quickly to support Georgia’s pro-democracy forces and deter escalation or prioritize containment and risk ceding strategic relevance in the South Caucasus.

Yet this scenario also presents a fleeting window of opportunity. A Ukrainian breakthrough could reignite Western confidence and unity, enabling the EU and U.S. to deter further Russian encroachment through a mix of targeted sanctions, public diplomacy and reengagement offers tied to democratic reforms. If timed alongside renewed civic momentum inside Georgia, such actions could constrain Georgian Dream’s authoritarian drift and reopen space for democratic resilience before Moscow fully recalibrates its strategy in the post-war environment.