EU Should Make Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkans a New Offer

The EU must not reject their commitment to Europe. After the European Commission has examined all the applications, the EU will also have its say. This is also stated in the summit declaration. To offer the three Eastern European countries the prospect of accession would undoubtedly be a striking political signal. But the prospect of accession must not remain an empty gesture. In view of the new geopolitical situation, it should be understood as a strategic commitment on the part of the EU. It must be followed by concrete and well-considered steps. Above all, the EU must be prepared to leave the outdated path of its enlargement policy of the last two decades.

The emptiness of candidate status

We should not lie to ourselves: EU candidate status has almost no practical significance. And perhaps it will not acquire any for years or even decades to come. This is the experience of the countries of the Western Balkans, which have been candidates for EU membership for many years without having seen much light at the end of the tunnel.

The reason for this is the laborious and over-bureaucratised negotiation process that drags on interminably. There are tall demands for reform, which were formulated for good reason, but which in practice can be instrumentalised by countries in the EU that are critical of enlargement. In particular, the deep-seated scepticism about enlargement in important member states will not disappear anytime soon, despite all the current sympathy for Ukraine. The EU accession process, whose beginning is always marked by lofty speeches and symbolic gestures, has therefore in recent years stood for stagnation rather than the confidence that the Eastern European and Western Balkan states are desperately in need of right now.

It is why the EU must fundamentally change its policy towards its European neighbours, regardless of whether it wants to grant Ukraine candidate status or not.

What does that mean for Ukraine in concrete terms? First of all, Ukraine would, of course, need a reconstruction plan if it survives the war as a sovereign state. Without functioning state-administrative structures or intact infrastructure, the EU would have no real partner with whom it could negotiate at all.

Irrespective of this, however, the country needs above all a realistic and attractive goal that promotes the Europeanisation of the country, i.e. one that concretises the path towards the EU. For even if Ukraine were a formal candidate country, there is no question that full membership in the EU would be a long way off. There would be no accelerated admission procedure for battered Ukraine, no discounts in terms of the rule of law or in the implementation of accession conditions.

In view of this, the EU can and must develop a new strategy, an “ever-closer partnership” with Ukraine and other countries in the Eastern and Balkan neighbourhood.

EEA membership a start

The core of a new realistic offer on the part of the EU should be early integration into the Common Market in the form of Ukraine’s accession to the European Economic Area (EEA).

Membership in the EEA differs from membership in the EU in particular in that it allows full participation in the single market without political incorporation into the EU’s decision-making structures. This is maximum integration with the EU without formal membership. For Ukraine as well as Moldova and Georgia – but also applying to the Western Balkan states – this would result in a more intensive connection to the EU than is possible with the current Association Agreements.

Of course, EEA accession could not happen overnight either. It requires no less preparation and adjustment than EU membership. Nevertheless, the difference with the current EU enlargement process would be enormous. Without the prospect of having to admit countries into the EU’s institutional systems, an important argument against Ukraine’s inclusion in a core area of European integration falls away. Unlike the highly politicised enlargement process, where the tempers and partial interests of member states always cause blockades, the prospect of EEA accession would have to be based on clear criteria and a firm commitment by the EU. This would define a concrete and tangible intermediate goal that would provide incentives for reform efforts without abandoning the goal of full membership. On the contrary, the political reservations against a country’s admission would be significantly lower if this intermediate stage, which is necessary for EU membership anyway, were successfully completed.

There is no question that in the case of Ukraine, which has been economically weakened by the war, temporary, asymmetrical protective measures for the market there would be necessary. The EU should also consider offering cohesion funds and partial inclusion in the Common Agricultural Policy to a certain extent for participating countries after possible EEA accession.

As much as it is important today to formulate and communicate a feasible, medium-term goal, it is clear that even this lies far in the future. This makes it all the more important to deepen existing forms of cooperation between the EU and countries willing to integrate beyond its eastern borders in the coming years and to establish new ones. This applies above all to energy and climate policies. Today, the EU is not only striving for climate neutrality by 2050, but also for a revision of its energy security policy. Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that want to join the EU must be thought of as part of this transformation from the very outset.

Therefore, it would be necessary to develop an integrated “European Climate and Energy Partnership” with these countries. In exchange for a sustainability-oriented transformation, which could be supported by a Green Fund for Eastern Europe, the partners would, for example, be exempted from the planned CO2 border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). The principle of energy solidarity could also be extended to them.

All this could build on existing cooperation within the framework of the European Energy Community. The recent example of Moldova, among others, shows that the EU should be prepared to expand its efforts to improve the energy resilience of neighbouring countries. Certainly, the countries of the Western Balkans could also be included in such a cooperation framework.

All this sounds abstract, even illusory, in these days of war. And yet the EU cannot simply stand by. If it takes action now, the EU has the chance to be a few steps ahead of events for once and not just forced to run after them. For this to happen, however, it also needs pacemakers who ensure that initiatives are introduced, processes started and developments advanced. It is obvious that Germany and Poland are predestined to play this role. They should work to ensure that Ukraine is granted candidate status. Given their differences on this issue, however, they should not get embroiled in discussions about formal details. It is more important that Berlin and Warsaw initiate long-term cooperation based on strong political commitment.

As soon as hostilities cease, the EU should have an ambitious and realistic offer for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, going beyond the Eastern Partnership format and avoiding the pitfalls of the previous enlargement policy. Only then will the European perspective for these countries be a real source of hope for their citizens and for the EU.

Piotr Buras is Head of the Warsaw Office of the think tank European Council on Foreign Relations. Kai-Olaf Lang is Senior Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.