Deterring Kremlin Grey Zone Aggression Against NATO
Russia’s pugilistic actions in the sub-threshold-of-war grey zone leave Allies uneasy, and require contemplation before a proper response.
At the beginning of 2025, I wrote about the Kremlin’s growing grey zone aggression across Europe and the growing likelihood that the Kremlin’s leaders would ‘test’ NATO’s commitment to collective defence.
Since that article was published, the Kremlin appears to have grown more brazen as concerns continue to be raised about the Trump administration’s commitment to their allies; although Trump’s August meeting with Zelensky was a great improvement from February’s, his statements and track record imply an interest in an announcement of peace that could leave Ukraine vulnerable rather than committing to a long-term peace process combined with pressure on the Kremlin.
Moreover, even if fighting were to cease in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s grey zone aggression would not end with it. Indeed, it is likely to increase to destabilise the West and give the Kremlin an asymmetric advantage. These rapid developments make the discussion of deterring grey zone aggression critical; the Kremlin’s success in the grey zone is emboldening it to escalate its actions, contributing to a sense of impunity that increases the likelihood of kinetic action against more vulnerable NATO states in the Baltics.
This article examines the failures of past deterrence efforts and explores actionable strategies to prepare for and respond to Kremlin operations; particularly its information and influence activities, which play a critical enabling role. By learning from both history and modern successes, enhancing our understanding of our adversary and expanding cooperation, NATO members can develop a resilient framework that combines societal preparedness, strategic communication, and ethical yet robust countermeasures. The goal: to deny Moscow the freedom to act in the grey zone without consequence and undermine its confidence in targeting smaller NATO members.
Lessons from Failures in Grey-Zone Deterrence
The failure to effectively deter grey zone aggression has been most starkly illustrated in two key examples over the past decade and a half: the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Syrian Civil War (2011-2024).
Information and influence activities to establish reflexive control precede kinetic actions to weaken the target from the top and bottom of society long before kinetic action takes place.
The Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent undeclared war in eastern Ukraine through to 2022 marked a watershed moment in the West’s understanding of grey zone tactics. Russia employed proxy forces, masked its military presence with ‘little green men,’ and flooded information spaces with disinformation – both to obscure responsibility and to shape perceptions among local populations and international audiences. This ambiguity exploited the West’s legal and political thresholds for response, amplified its anxieties over conflict, and projected an image of a powerful Russia that could not be beaten without apocalyptic sacrifice. This created a fait acompli and exposed NATO’s lack of preparation for countering hybrid tactics.
Similarly, during the Syrian civil war, while the Assad regime’s chemical attacks were overt, the Kremlin’s support shifted the conflict into the grey zone. Moscow not only helped obscure responsibility for the attacks but launched a coordinated campaign of disinformation and cyber interference to discredit evidence, sow doubt, and paralyse international consensus on the attacks and anti-Assad forces. These actions likely contributed to President Obama’s failure to enforce his publicly declared red line, eroding Western credibility. Throughout the conflict, the Kremlin employed aggressive information strategies to empower the Assad regime Despite clear evidence of chemical weapons use and other regime atrocities, Kremlin-backed narratives continued to influence public discourse, demonstrating the lingering effects of grey zone strategies.
Both cases explicitly illustrate how grey zone aggression confuses attribution, divides alliances, and exploits legal grey areas, ultimately undermining timely and unified deterrent action by NATO and its partners. Both examples further demonstrate how information and influence activities often go hand in hand with kinetic operations to produce maximum effect. Repeated studies from the Soviet to the Putin era have demonstrated the importance of ‘informational psychological operations’ and establishing ‘reflexive control’ in Kremlin campaigns and in its political-military mindset to the point it has been elevated to both an objective science and a military religion. It is a key enabler of Kremlin operations and power projection.
Information and influence activities to establish reflexive control precede kinetic actions to weaken the target from the top and bottom of society long before kinetic action takes place. Elites are targeted through weaponised graft to gain influence over individuals and policymaking, and persistent messaging to the wider population serves to undermine their faith in their governments, systems, and the concept of knowable truth. This takes place online but also offline through proxy movements and actors, and unwitting conduits. By the time the kinetic action takes place in a deliberately obfuscated manner, targets are already vulnerable to a state of decision-making paralysis. This is especially true of democracies, where decision-makers are particularly influenced by public opinion. Consequently, deterrence of information and influence activities is critical to disrupting the Kremlin’s ability to conduct kinetic operations.