China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”¹ 

This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. 

This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.

To understand today’s Sino-Russian relationship, it is necessary to review key historical milestones. Separated for centuries by harsh deserts, dense forests, and imposing mountains, early Chinese and Russian entities had minimal direct interaction — primarily through commerce — before the 16th century. In the 13th century, the Golden Horde,² a Mongol khanate led by Genghis Khan’s grandson Batu, conquered the Russian principalities.³ Around the same time, another grandson, Kublai Khan, subjugated China and established the Yuan dynasty. The Pax Mongolica that followed only partially bridged the vast cultural and civilizational gap between the two regions. 

The first Russian to refer explicitly to China may have been the merchant Afanasy Nikitin, in his 15th-century travelogue, A Journey Beyond the Three Seas. Later, Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who halted tribute payments to the Golden Horde, recognized the importance of developing relations with China.⁴ Direct contact between China and Muscovy — and later the Russian Empire — began in the early 17th century with Russia’s expansion into Siberia, the Pacific, and Central Asia.

Initial conflicts emerged when Russian settlers moved into the Lake Baikal and Amur River regions, home to Siberian tribes under Qing imperial authority. However, the Qing dynasty, adhering to a hierarchical worldview, did not treat the Russians as equals but as “barbarians.” It took nearly two centuries for Russia to establish sustained diplomatic relations with the Qing court.⁵ 

The first formal agreements between the two powers were the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kyakhta (1727). These were followed by a series of “unequal treaties,” from the Chinese perspective, including the Treaties of Aigun (1858), of Beijing (1860), of Saint Petersburg (1881), and, in Central Asia, of Chuguchak (1884).⁶ These confirmed Russia’s annexation of territories that Beijing considered its own. With the construction of the southeastern branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway to link Vladivostok and Port Arthur directly — bypassing Khabarovsk — Russia took control of Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula. 

Despite proclaiming an anti-imperialist ideology after 1917, Soviet Russia never returned the nearly two million square kilometers it annexed. Lenin, despite his revolutionary ideals and support for the Chinese revolution, did not reverse the territorial acquisitions. Stalin, resuming the imperial traditions of the Tsarist regime, maintained a pragmatic nationalist stance and balanced support for both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists during Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s. This ambivalence ended only in 1945, when the Soviet army entered Manchuria and shifted full support to the Chinese Communist Party, paving the way for the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. 

The Soviet Union was quick to recognize the new Chinese government, but the relationship was marked by underlying mistrust. Stalin saw Mao as an unreliable “margarine Communist,” and after Stalin’s death, Mao held Khrushchev and Brezhnev in contempt. He labeled the Soviet Union as “revisionist” and “social imperialist” while pressing for China’s territorial claims. In turn, the Soviets viewed China, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, as dangerously “deviationist and leftist.”⁷ At its core, the conflict stemmed from a clash of egos and a struggle for leadership within the international Communist and anti-imperialist movement. 

Tensions between the two powers escalated to the point of near-nuclear conflict in 1969. This confrontation began to subside only with the emergence of two pragmatic leaders — Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing — who moved toward more constructive bilateral engagement. The relationship was then redefined based on “three don’ts” and “three do’s.”⁸ One major sticking point — the Sino-Soviet border dispute — was set aside by Deng as a conciliatory gesture. The issue was formally resolved through agreements signed on October 14, 2003, and July 21, 2008. 

Nevertheless, the memory of the territorial annexations remains vivid in Chinese public consciousness. Beijing periodically publishes maps that depict these areas — including cities like Vladivostok (referred to as Haishenwai) — as historically Chinese territory. As British travel writer Colin Thubron notes, “Even now, the Chinese have not formally retracted their claim to the territory seized by imperial Russia north of the Amur (Heilongjiang in Chinese)... The Heilongjiang, like all the greatest waters of China, flows west-east, an axis still deep in Chinese thinking, and this geographical trajectory might suggest that the river belongs to China.”⁹ Thus, the territorial question continues to be present in the collective psyche of the Chinese while sometimes feeding an irrational fear among a minority of Russians. These psychological elements will undoubtedly continue to leave their mark on future Russian-Chinese relations.

Russia’s pivot toward the Asia-Pacific began in the late Soviet era, under Gorbachev — most notably with his 1986 Vladivostok speech — and continued under Yeltsin.¹⁰ Vladimir Putin, after assuming power in 2000, and Xi Jinping, who rose to power in 2012, gave this reorientation a distinctly ideological and geopolitical dimension. It gained new urgency in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the intervention in Donbas. 

During this period, bilateral relations significantly deepened. Several factors contributed to this evolution. Central among them is the close personal relationship between Putin and Xi, who have met over forty times — prompting some observers to describe their dynamic as a political “bromance.”¹¹ There is also strong ideological compatibility: both countries oppose Western liberalism and challenge American “hegemony.” As nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, they share overlapping strategic visions.¹² Economically, their roles are complementary — Russia as a resource supplier and China as an industrial and technological powerhouse. Strategically, China benefits from the geographic depth Russia provides in the north, especially as Beijing manages tensions in Taiwan and the South China Sea. This strategic alignment has led to regular joint military exercises across land, air, and sea. 

Russia’s “Eastward Turn” accelerated following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Faced with harsh Western sanctions and the loss of European energy markets, Moscow was forced to intensify its alignment with China economically, politically, and ideologically. 

On February 4, 2022, two weeks before the invasion, Putin and Xi signed a major declaration in Beijing titled “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on International Relations: Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development.” In the characteristically grandiose language favored by both capitals, the statement proclaimed that the new relationship between Russia and China was “superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era.” It emphasized that their friendship had “no limits,” that “no areas of cooperation are forbidden,” and that their growing strategic coordination was neither directed against third parties nor constrained by changes in the global environment.¹³ This declaration was followed by others, all equally grandiloquent, though the “no forbidden areas” of cooperation are not always mentioned.¹⁴ Xi’s state visit to Moscow on May 8–10 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany resulted in the signing of several documents with the Russian president.¹⁵ Russia welcomed some twenty heads of state and government, including Xi, as guests of honor for the May 9 military parade. Chinese troops marched through Red Square in Moscow. 

Diplomatically, while clear about their political objectives, these documents contain no binding provisions that would formalize an alliance or require signing a treaty, creating strategic ambiguity. In a way, the two countries have become “allies without a treaty.”¹⁶ Their relationship has thus evolved beyond a simple “axis of convenience,” as British scholar Bobo Lo wrote in 2008.¹⁷ However, they have not yet established a formal alliance like the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed by Mao and Stalin in February 1950 — a painful memory for the Chinese. This text obliged the young PRC to grant the Soviet Union exclusive access to its economic and industrial activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang, signaled China’s full alignment with the USSR, and closed the door on any rapprochement with the United States. 

The new type of relations between Moscow and Beijing seems better suited to the current fluidity of the international landscape.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused China to lose an important partner in Eastern Europe. Sino-Ukrainian relations were relatively good before the Russian invasion. Beijing had recognized the new Ukraine in January 1992, shortly after its independence. Subsequently, Sino-Ukrainian relations fluctuated depending on Ukrainian presidents. They were excellent under the presidency of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, who hosted his counterpart Hu Jintao in Kyiv for a state visit. In 2013, Ukraine became a “strategic partner” of China, and its head of state visited Beijing that same year. But political ties cooled during the dramatic events of the 2014 Euromaidan protests in Kyiv. This large-scale, violent movement was in response to President Yanukovych’s decision to not sign a political association and free trade agreement with the European Union, under pressure from Moscow, and instead assume closer ties with Russia. While Yanukovich fled to Russia, these events triggered Russia’s annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in southern and eastern Ukraine. China adopted an ambiguous position, torn between its support for Moscow and its desire to respect the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. Despite a desire to maintain relations with its Russian ally, Beijing has not recognized the annexation of Crimea or other Ukrainian oblasts.¹⁹ 

These political changes have not prevented Ukraine from becoming an important economic partner of China. By 2020, China had replaced Russia as Ukraine’s largest trading partner. In addition to corn and aircraft engines, China purchased military equipment from Ukraine, including the hull of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. In 2016, Beijing attempted to purchase Ukrainian aerospace giant Motor Sich, which was ultimately nationalized by Kyiv under pressure from Washington.²⁰ 

Chinese direct investment amounted to $150 million in 2019 and $75.5 million in the first three quarters of the following year. Loans granted by Beijing to Kyiv totaled nearly $7 billion²¹ and mainly focused on the infrastructure, transportation, and energy sectors. Ukraine viewed itself as the natural gateway to Europe for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the “Northern Corridor” through Russian territory, taking advantage of the favorable customs regime established by the 2016 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. The Russian invasion put an end to this project.²² 

Beijing appears to have been taken by surprise by the Russian invasion.²³ It is unclear to what extent Putin warned Xi of this attack during his visit to Beijing in February 2022. Chinese officials also seem to have been surprised by Russia’s initial failures in the conflict.²⁴ Despite this, Beijing adopted a rather ambivalent “pro-Russian neutrality.” Admittedly, the invasion contradicted the principles of international law that China claims to uphold. Yet, interests dictated that it not abandon its Russian ally during a critical moment. 

To put on a good face, China launched diplomatic initiatives to try to resolve the conflict. On February 23, 2023, one year after the invasion, it published the twelve-point “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis.” The document’s first point reiterates a principle it has always defended, according to which “the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld.” Points three and four consider that “all parties should support Russia and Ukraine in working in the same direction and resuming direct dialogue as quickly as possible.” It indicates that “all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of the crisis must be encouraged and supported.” In point ten, the declaration states that “unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure cannot solve the issue; they only create new problems.” Finally, in a notably pragmatic tone, the document concludes: “The international community needs to take measures to support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict zones. China stands ready to provide assistance and play a constructive role in this endeavor.”²⁵ 

The Chinese declaration, while recalling principles of international law, offers no concrete solutions, settlement plan, negotiation framework, or call for withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. However, it has had concrete consequences, such as the appointment of Li Hui, former ambassador to Moscow, as a “special representative” in charge of the Ukrainian conflict. Li has toured several European countries and Russia to initiate “the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.”²⁶ 

More recently, as part of the “Friends of Peace” group within the United Nations and in coordination with Brazil, Beijing released a joint statement in May 2024 outlining six points expressing their vision for ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. In this document, the two countries emphasize that dialogue and negotiations are the only way to resolve the crisis. They propose holding an international peace conference “at an appropriate time” with equal participation from all parties and a discussion of existing peace plans.²⁷ However, similar to its February 2023 twelve-point proposal, the document does not mention restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, nor does it hold the aggressor state, Russia, accountable for violating international agreements. 

While hoping for greater Chinese involvement, Ukrainians remain skeptical of China’s diplomatic initiatives. President Volodymyr Zelensky was recently disturbed by reports that more than one hundred Chinese soldiers were fighting on the Russian side.²⁸ These individuals reportedly joined Russian forces of their own volition, responding to advertisements appearing on Chinese social media platforms such as Douyin rather than through any official PRC directive.²⁹ China’s behavior contrasts sharply with that of North Korea, which, under a mutual defense agreement signed in Pyongyang in June 2024 by Putin and Kim, has dispatched 14,000 fighters, along with equipment, munitions, and missiles.³⁰ 

These Chinese diplomatic initiatives appear deliberately limited, intending to signal engagement rather than drive a resolution. Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities aligns with China’s geostrategic interests, as it directs Western and, for the moment, U.S. military attention and assistance toward Ukraine and Europe at the expense of East Asia. However, this quasi-support for Moscow, which includes the delivery of nonlethal equipment and the circumvention of Western embargoes, is risky for Beijing. In addition to facing the threat of the United States’ “secondary sanctions,” this strategic partnership “increasingly collides with its broader ambitions to be seen as a responsible global leader and as a steadying alternative to what it depicts as American volatility and Western decline.”³¹

Meetings between the two countries’ top leaders are more frequent than either has with their counterparts in other countries. Since 2012, Putin and Xi have met more than forty times, while their foreign ministers speak or meet almost monthly. Xi’s visit to Moscow for the May 9 ceremonies commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazism was his eleventh.³² 

Economically, trade volume between the countries is substantial, reaching $245 billion by 2024. This is more than double the 2020 figure and a 66% increase compared to 2021, the year before the invasion. Russian exports to China consist mainly of natural resources and energy products. Last year, oil deliveries reached a record $62.26 billion, a 54% increase compared to 2021. In natural gas, Gazprom delivered 31 bcm to China last year, with volumes expected to increase to 38 bcm this year. Furthermore, nearly 40% of Russian international trade is now denominated in yuan, compared to 2% in January 2022.³³ 

Another indicator of strengthened ties is the construction of new bridges over the Amur River (Heilongjiang) and the opening of several border crossings. This new infrastructure suggests that Moscow is no longer concerned about growing Chinese influence in Siberia and the Russian Far East.³⁴ These highly complementary exchanges form the foundation of the Sino-Russian strategic alignment. However, the relationship has its limitations. 

First, there is undoubtedly a psychological element. Russia, previously a global superpower until the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, likely resents finding itself economically and technologically outpaced by China. It seems a distant memory that Moscow once occupied the “older brother” position to a young, developing PRC. Yet Beijing is careful to preserve Russian pride and sensitivities, which remain strategically useful. 

Second, the economic disparity between the two countries is enormous. In 2025, Russia’s nominal GDP is projected to be $2.135 trillion, while China’s will be $21.643 trillion. According to the International Monetary Fund, China surpassed Russia’s GDP per capita by 2020.³⁵ The economic gap between the two countries has widened so much that some observers consider Moscow a “junior partner” of Beijing.³⁶ 

This disproportion and asymmetry also affects trade. Although significant in absolute terms, trade between the two countries is much smaller than that between China and the United States ($582.9 billion in 2024) and between China and the European Union ($739 billion in 2023). While China is Russia’s largest trading partner, Moscow holds only a tiny share of the Chinese market, with 70% of Russian exports consisting of raw materials and energy products. In contrast, Chinese products are dominated by high-value-added industrial goods such as automobiles, electronics, and consumer goods, as well as dual-use goods and, increasingly, machine tools and chip manufacturing equipment.³⁷ In these sectors, China has replaced Western companies that left Russia following sanctions. 

Even Russian natural gas exports are experiencing limitations. With 21.3 bcm of gas to China via the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline (expected to ramp up to 38 bcm by 2025),³⁸ deliveries to China still represent only about 15% of Russia’s former exports to the European Union, which peaked at around 200 billion cubic meters annually.³⁹ Moreover, the sticking point remains the price each side pays for natural gas shipments. China reportedly asked Russia to sell its gas at domestic Russian rates — about $60 per 1,000 cubic meters. That would be roughly one-quarter of what China currently pays under the Power of Siberia 1 agreement, which delivers gas at $260 per 1,000 cubic meters. Furthermore, China was prepared to buy only a fraction of the pipeline’s 50 bcm capacity. As for the Power of Siberia 2 project, which is still on the drawing board, China appears reluctant to commit to the enormous planned investments ($67 billion), to which should be added $27 billion in indirect investments.⁴⁰ The reality is that China wants to diversify its imports as much as possible by limiting Russia’s supply to no more than 30% of its gas and 20% of its oil. Its investments in renewable energy further reduce China’s dependence on fossil fuel imports. Overall, major Chinese investments in Russia ceased in 2022, mainly because Chinese companies are reluctant to engage with the Russian market due to the growing risk of U.S. “secondary sanctions.” In contrast, Russian companies have begun making significant investments in China.⁴¹ 

Third, on the diplomatic front, despite the alignment between the two countries, some divergences at the United Nations regarding votes on resolutions condemning the war in Ukraine are notable. China’s abstentions in the General Assembly and the Security Council have tended to increase between 2018 and early 2025.⁴² In March 2022, a few days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Qin Gang, Chinese ambassador to the United States, declared that there are no areas prohibited from Russian-Chinese cooperation, excluding, he added, “the principles of the UN Charter, the universally recognized norms of international law, and the fundamental guidelines for international relations.”⁴³ Fu Cong, the Chinese ambassador to the European Union, described the unlimited partnership as mere “rhetoric.”⁴⁴ 

Overall, the “no limits” Sino-Russian partnership does have limitations. In addition to the psychological, economic, and diplomatic limits mentioned above, there is the added weight of history and centuries-old distrust. 

The Levada Center, a Russian public opinion research institute, recently published a report on Russian public attitudes toward China. When asked directly whether China poses a threat to Russia, “only one in five respondents answered in the affirmative, while the majority (72%) did not think so.” Per the survey, the three main fears regarding China were: (1) China’s seizure of Russian territories, (2) economic dependence on China, and (3) a potential military clash. The report notes that a direct military clash between the two countries is rarely discussed and only probable if Russia “cease[s] to be independent, fail[s] to revitalize industry, or if China itself begins to face difficulties that it wants to solve at Russia’s expense.” It also discusses the risk of falling into complete dependence and “becoming a vassal of China,” after which Beijing will be able to dictate terms and “close up shop at any time, just as America and Europe did.”⁴⁵ 

Certain Russian circles close to the government, particularly the secret services, have seized on this diffuse feeling. Most recently, a leaked secret Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) document, picked up by the New York Times, warned of Chinese espionage in Russia, particularly in military research circles. The article notes that “the FSB document lends credence to the theory that, with the right approach, Russia can be cleaved away from China,” but also suggests that the “fact that Mr. Putin is apparently well aware of the risks of a closer relationship with China and has decided to push ahead anyway could suggest little opportunity for the United States to get Russia to change course.”⁴⁶

By amplifying the trade war against China, the Trump administration has strengthened the Sino-Russian axis. Its aim to weaken ties between the two countries and conduct a “reverse Kissinger” has produced no tangible results. China, ever pragmatic, remains uncertain whether Trump’s continual quixotic promises will hold in four years — or even two, should the Republicans lose their congressional majority. Moreover, Trump’s sudden rapprochement with Putin risks criticism from the American public, where 85% remain hostile to the Russian president.⁴⁷ The signals given so far by the Trump administration appear inconsistent, while the Moscow-Beijing alliance remains solid, with Putin hastening to reassure Xi on the phone on February 24, 2025, of his commitment to pursuing the partnership with China. Despite Trump’s efforts, it remains highly likely that Beijing will continue its pro-Russia policy.⁴⁸ 

One might assume that the U.S.-China trade war could benefit Russia. Indeed, Moscow and Washington export many of the same goods to China, including oil, gas, and coal. In 2024, the United States sold 10.8 million tons of oil, 4.16 million tons of liquefied natural gas, and 14.1 million tons of coal to China. Despite Russia’s declarations that it can replace the United States, it faces infrastructure and transportation limitations. Land-based oil transportation (i.e., pipeline and rail) reached capacity at 41 million tons in 2024, and tanker transport is unprofitable for Moscow.⁴⁹ Gas deliveries via the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline cannot be significantly increased; Western sanctions and the challenges of winter navigation with undersized Russian tankers in the Arctic Ocean pose significant challenges. Coal faces a similar situation, as falling prices, long distances, and the limited capacity of Russian ports and railways do not allow for significant export growth. 

Likewise, agricultural products, which the United States supplies in large quantities to China ($27 billion in 2024, compared to $7.4 billion for Russia), cannot be replaced by Russian deliveries, mainly due to the same transportation bottlenecks and phytosanitary restrictions.⁵⁰ Russian agricultural production is also less attractive than that of Brazil or Kazakhstan, which have become the main beneficiaries of the trade war with the United States. 

Conversely, one might expect that Chinese exports no longer accepted by the U.S. market could be redirected to Russia at lower prices. But Russia lacks the capacity to absorb these goods or the capabilities needed for re-export. Moreover, most Chinese banks refuse to work with Russian clients for fear of secondary sanctions and are forced to use intermediaries, resulting in additional costs and delays. According to Russian banking circles, by summer 2024, 98% of Chinese banks had ceased accepting direct payments from Russian companies.⁵¹ 

Nonetheless, trade between Russia and China has continued to increase. The countries share geoeconomic advantages such as proximity, a long border, and the relative security of land routes and transportation methods. Land routes are less vulnerable to U.S. military targeting in the event of conflict, unlike maritime routes. Here too, the more relations between Beijing and Washington deteriorate, the more important Russia becomes to China.

The relationship between China and Russia is marked by deep ambivalence. On one hand lies a long history of misunderstanding, conflict, exploitation, and mutual mistrust — factors once expected to keep the two countries apart. On the other hand, present-day conditions have brought them closer together, fostering a strategic partnership based largely on pragmatism. This dynamic is likely to persist for as long as each side needs the other to confront the shared challenges posed by the United States and broader international upheaval. As a multipolar world gradually takes shape, the outcome may well be a renewed bipolar order centered on the United States and China. In such a configuration, Moscow — relegated to the role of junior partner — could find itself “recruited” to serve Beijing’s strategic interests, particularly in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. 

This Sino-Russian alignment has deepened significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beijing continues to back Moscow’s war effort and see Russia as an indispensable strategic partner. In this context, China has no interest in either a total Russian defeat or a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine. As China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, reportedly told a senior EU official during a recent European visit, “Beijing [does] not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fear[s] the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing.”⁵² From this perspective, the prolongation of the war serves China’s strategic interests. 

The Sino-Russian partnership now extends far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine, as illustrated by the growing volume of trade and deepening energy interdependence between Moscow and Beijing. More broadly, Russia continues to serve as a useful partner for China, not only in securing regime stability at home and regional stability in Central Asia but also in helping Beijing rally support across the Global South and promote an alternative to the Western-led global order. Furthermore, the methods Moscow has developed to circumvent Western sanctions may prove invaluable to Beijing in a potential Taiwan conflict. 

For the West, however, China’s firm stance has led to a diplomatic stalemate. In Washington’s case, any peace initiative regarding Ukraine now appears unlikely given Putin’s determination to continue the war and consistent Chinese support. As for the European Union, the ongoing rhetorical balance of labeling China simultaneously as a “partner for cooperation,” “economic competitor,” and “systemic rival” has changed little despite Beijing’s charm offensive. Progress remains stalled on nearly all major international issues, including Ukraine, Russia, and North Korea. Even on trade, China has offered only marginal, largely symbolic concessions, such as on French cognac and rare earth exports. Climate, environmental issues, and public health seem to offer the few areas of common ground for cooperation. 

Still, opportunities for dialogue remain, even though the EU-China Summit on July 24 in Beijing, marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, fell short of expectations. For the European Union, it is vital to convey a clear message to Beijing that Russian aggression in Ukraine — whether advancing or retreating — continues to represent a fundamental threat to European security.