Before the decisive attack? What was the summer like on the front for Ukraine and Russia, and what will autumn bring

The spring-summer offensive campaign of the Russian army did not bring it significant successes on the battlefield. It showed that Moscow may face new problems in the coming months. What is it about?

The Russian army began its offensive campaign in late May, when the number of clashes recorded by the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to stay above 200 per day.

If we are guided by this parameter, the increase in the activity of the Russian armed forces occurred in early July, when 270 to 290 battles were taking place on the front per day, but by the end of August the number of attacks began to decrease.

In early September, the Ukrainian command reported about 220 battles.

The largest number was recorded in the Donetsk region near Kostantynivka and Dobropil.

Here the Russian army managed to achieve the greatest successes during the summer.

However, another important point is that the area of ​​territory captured during this offensive is not only tens of times smaller than last year's indicators, but also does not actually grow for the second month in a row.

In addition, during the summer, the Ukrainian army managed to carry out several counter-offensive operations, in particular in the Aleksandrivskoye, Zaporizhzhia, Limanskoye and Kupyanskoye directions (in the area of ​​the village of Dvorichna).

According to the calculations of OSINT analysts from DeepState and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), during the summer the Russian Federation managed to capture 235 to 270 square kilometers. This is almost four times less than in the same period last year.

In addition, this does not take into account how much territory the Russian army lost this year. According to the statements of the Ukrainian authorities, the area of ​​liberated territory in 2026 almost approached the area of ​​the occupied.

Volodymyr Zelensky says that by the end of August, the Russian Federation had managed to capture almost 990 square kilometers since the beginning of the year, and had lost 820.

“We believe that in 2026 we will reach the same number of kilometers of Ukrainian territory that was temporarily occupied by the Russians and that we liberated,” Zelensky said.

Another indicator is the Russian army’s irreversible losses (killed, seriously wounded, captured), which the Ukrainian General Staff reports daily. In July and August, they reached a record 40,000 to 43,000 people per month.

Taken together, these figures may indicate that the Russian offensive is beginning to stagnate.

Increasing losses without significant advances deep into enemy defenses could lead to the exhaustion of Russian troops, which in turn could lead to a loss of strategic initiative.

“The summer offensive of the Russian army did not gain operational scale, there was no breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses,” describes the situation Viktor Kevlyuk, a reserve colonel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and an expert at the Center for Defense Strategies.

Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, calls this year’s situation “the best for Ukraine since 2023.”

“I don’t want to paint too rosy a picture, but overall, for Ukraine this war marked, if not a turning point, then at least a turn for the better,” the analyst noted in the One Decision podcast in early August.

At the same time, he stressed that Russia still has no intention of stopping the offensive and that months of heavy fighting lie ahead.

What is the situation on the front?

Indeed, despite the increase in losses and the overall slowdown in the pace of the offensive, the Russian army still retains the initiative in most areas. First of all, in the Donetsk region.

Here, after the loss of Pokrovsk in the spring, the personnel of the Ukrainian army focused on the defense of the last major city in the western part of the Donbass - Dobropil.

In the summer, a powerful Russian group, consisting of two combined armies of the Russian Federation, began to move towards this settlement and managed to approach its outskirts.

At the end of August, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of the village of Hannivka, which is actually the eastern outskirts of Dobropil.

Published footage of combat operations by Ukrainian units confirms the penetration of several groups of Russian attack aircraft into this settlement, but the question remains whether the Russian army managed to consolidate itself there.

The Ukrainian armed forces also acknowledge the presence of the enemy in the village of Biletske south of Dobropil. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported its capture in late July.

Currently, the Russian military's efforts are focused on finding ways to cut the Dobropil'-Kramatorsk highway.

The Kremlin already tried to carry out this operation a year ago, but then the Ukrainian armed forces launched a counteroffensive in this area and pushed the enemy back.

Cutting the route will allow the Russian Federation to gradually move into the rear of the Ukrainian group defending the "belt of fortresses" Slavyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostyaninovka.

At the same time, Russian military personnel are also trying to approach these cities from the south and east.

Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin said that over the summer, Russian troops managed to completely capture Kostyantynivka and break through the first line of Ukrainian defense near Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, approaching these cities at a distance of 1.5 to four kilometers.

Ukrainian authorities deny this.

As for Kostyantynivka, a source in the military command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine told the BBC that "dozens" of Ukrainian positions still remain in the city. Fighting continues in the central and northern parts of the settlement.

According to the source, the Russian army still needs to conquer eight to 10 kilometers to reach the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

Powerful groups have been created to protect the cities under the command of Generals Andriy Biletsky and Denis Prokopenko.

Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for Military Affairs Pavlo Palisa said that the Kremlin has set a goal to complete the capture of Donbass by December 31, 2026.

According to him, the Russian military command has called the deadline until March 31, 2027 more realistic.

General Palisa is convinced that the Russian army will not be able to complete the task by either the first or second deadline.

Stretching forces and infiltration tactics

Having resisted the Ukrainian defense in the Donetsk region, the Russian command tried to stretch the enemy forces to other parts of the front.

First of all, this is about creating the so-called "buffer zone" in the border area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Putin announced this task back in the spring of 2025.

Over the past months, the Russian army has managed to break through the border in several areas at once, in particular near the villages of Kozacha Lopan (Kharkiv region) and Ryasne (Sumy region). However, the Russian Federation has not been able to consolidate these results. The Ukrainian defense forces have stopped the enemy's advance inland, although they have not managed to expel him from the territory under their control.

This "push-pull" situation that has developed this year has had another effect - the intensification of the "propaganda operations" of the Russian army.

We are talking about the so-called infiltrations of individual ultra-small groups of attack aircraft into small villages in the hinterland of Ukrainian territory in order to shoot staged videos about the alleged establishment of control over these settlements.

This tactic was clearly visible at the end of last year, when the Russian General Staff reported three times about the "occupation of Kupyansk", which did not correspond to reality.

The thinning of defense orders on certain sections of the front led to a rapid increase in this practice during the summer.

For example, Ukraine and Russia almost simultaneously reported on an offensive operation in the direction of Aleksandrivka, which, of course, took place in radically opposite directions.

This led to the fact that the map of the Russian General Staff began to differ from the Ukrainian one by tens of kilometers.

For example, the distance between the last settlement, the capture of which was reported by the Russian Ministry of Defense in the Aleksandrivska sector of the front, and the settlement, the liberation of which was reported by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is 30 kilometers.

OSINT analysts point out that such breakthroughs by individual Russian troops most often do not lead to the retention of territory. However, the Ukrainian command is forced to involve assault units to clear villages into which the enemy has managed to penetrate.

Another striking example is the statements of Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense on September 2 about the alleged capture of the city of Svyatohirsk (Donetsk region). In fact, this settlement is located 10-12 kilometers from the front line, and the Russian army has not even come close to its outskirts.

Focus on the rear

The lack of a breakthrough on the front has led both sides to shift their attention to operations behind enemy lines.

The Ukrainian authorities were the first to do this, announcing in late May a so-called "logistical blockade" for Russian troops in the south.

This included the launch of a campaign of daily drone attacks on Russian trucks on major logistics routes in the south of Zaporizhia, Kherson and Donetsk regions, as well as in Crimea.

The operation had some success, but closer to mid-summer the Russian Federation increased the number of mobile fire groups and strengthened the protection of these routes.

This reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes.

In parallel, the forces of unmanned systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched two of their own operations, also in the southern direction. About a hundred tankers and ships sailing in the Azov and Black Seas were attacked with the help of drones.

Drones also launched a campaign of strikes on energy facilities in Crimea. This led to the destruction and damage of dozens of substations and, consequently, problems with the energy supply of the peninsula.

On land, Ukraine, using deep-strike drones, has conducted a campaign to destroy the logistics centers of the large Russian logistics centers Wildberries and Ozon, and has continued to periodically attack refineries in the rear of the Russian Federation. This summer, Ukrainian drones reached the most remote oil refinery in Omsk, which is 2,700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Russia, for its part, has also focused its efforts on strikes in the Ukrainian rear.

Over the three summer months, Russia used a record number of ballistic missiles to attack Kiev and Odessa, and in late August began a campaign of daily mass drone attacks on the Ukrainian capital and its suburbs.

The targets of the attacks were the logistics centers of food and pharmaceutical companies, postal terminals, and warehouses.

In the Black Sea, Russia has managed to effectively block shipping traffic to Ukrainian ports, including the so-called "grain corridor," which Kiev used to export its agricultural products.

What will happen next

Statements from the leadership of Ukraine and Russia indicate that in the fall of 2026, not a reduction, but an escalation of the conflict is expected.

President Zelensky announced the "closing of the skies over Russia", and Putin called it "state terrorism".

The question remains how exactly Ukraine will try to "close the sky" and whether it has enough resources - we are talking, apparently, about long-range unmanned aerial vehicles - to implement its plan.

Also, the first combat use of the powerful and long-range ballistic missile FP-9 is planned for the fall of 2026. At least its manufacturer, Fire Point, has repeatedly publicly announced this event.

As for Russia, its leader Vladimir Putin has already stated that his army is preparing to attack Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

Given the critical shortage of Patriot anti-aircraft missiles in Kiev, we can expect Moscow's main strike weapon to be hundreds of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, as well as jet drones.

On the battlefield, an increase in activity may occur in October-November.

Deteriorating weather conditions may reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine's main weapon - attack and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. This, in turn, gives the Russian army a chance to successfully assert its superiority in manpower.

During this period, it is possible that direct fighting will begin in the residential areas of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivke and Dobropilye.

But the question is whether this advantage of Russia will be preserved in the coming months.

The record losses of the Russian armed forces during June-August may affect their offensive capabilities.

Only a new mobilization will allow for a relatively quick improvement of the situation.

But, judging by Putin's latest statements, the Kremlin considers mobilization to be a last resort.