An End to Russia’s War? Closer, But Not Yet Close
US President Trump deserves credit for one thing: he has put the end of Russia’s abominable war on Ukraine at the top of the international agenda. In less than a week, he has met with Vladimir Putin, who is prosecuting this war, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, who is defending his country, and several European leaders, including the heads of NATO and the EU, who are concerned about the future of Europe if Putin were to prevail.
Trump has brought up every issue of significance, including territory, abducted Ukrainian children, future security guarantees, a ceasefire, and a long-term peace agreement. He is pushing for an end to the war, and everyone’s attention is focused at the highest possible levels.
Marshalling such international attention is a good thing, and good may yet come of it. Thus far, however, we have seen absolutely no movement from Putin toward ending his war against Ukraine. For Putin to move, he needs to see that his state finances are collapsing, and his military cannot maintain its frontline effort in Ukraine. These conditions do not exist today, but they may ripen by the end of this year. If so, we may well see a ceasefire and the resurrection of deterrence to prevent future war.
By agreeing to meet in Alaska, President Trump has already offered a few diplomatic wins to Putin: unable to travel to most Western countries because of his 2023 indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for abducting Ukrainian children, Putin was welcomed to the United States, and Trump literally rolled out a red carpet. The US President backed off his call for an immediate ceasefire and agreed to work toward a permanent peace agreement instead. Trump also backed off his threat of severe secondary sanctions and tariffs if Putin did not implement an immediate ceasefire.
Putin did not reciprocate. He continued to reject a ceasefire. He maintained his maximalist demands, such as insisting that Ukraine formally cede territory to Russia which the latter has taken by force, and withdraw from additional territory that Russia has been unable to conquer. Putin left Alaska having not moved a single inch, while securing an easing of US pressure.
President Zelenskyy and European leaders, alarmed by what they saw in Alaska, flocked to Washington, DC three days later, on August 1,8 to hammer out their own clear position with President Trump. Though it may sound like faint praise, they made progress.
In contrast to their February meeting in the Oval Office, the August 18 encounter between Zelenskyy and Trump went well. The rapport among all the European leaders and President Trump was also good. There was no pressure on Ukraine to give up territory, and all involved agreed on the need for security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent future Russian aggression.
They supported direct talks between Putin, Zelenskyy, and Trump as a good next step to ending the war. President Trump even stepped out of the meeting to speak with Putin and reportedly secured the Russian leader’s agreement to a bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy, to be followed by a trilateral with President Trump.
Missing in all these diplomatic exchanges is a connection to the real world. Putin continues to pummel Ukrainian cities (with more than 600 drones and missiles launched from August 20 to 21 alone) even as talks continue. Putin parses his words carefully, so that even the diplomatic “progress” he seemed to imply is actually less than meets the eye.
Immediately after the European leaders and Zelenskyy had left Washington, Putin rolled out the fine print on his talks with Trump. According to Foreign Minister Lavrov, Putin would not actually meet with Zelenskyy right away (even as state-directed propagandists dismissed even the possibility of a summit).
Instead, he proposed a series of lower-level meetings to “create the conditions” for a future meeting. Lavrov also said security assurances for Ukraine could only happen if they were provided by Russia itself, whose interest in Ukrainian security rests upon a fox-chicken dynamic, and China, which is not much better. Putin continues to play games while maintaining his maximalist position.
The real-world situation is no different than two weeks ago, before all of this diplomacy, no different than seven months ago, when Trump took office, and indeed no different than three and a half years ago, when Russia first launched its full-scale invasion.
So how does any of this bring us closer to an end to the war? As time goes by, Russia is burning through its military and economic capacities. By the end of this year, it may be Russia that seeks a ceasefire.
Two key things are needed to convince Putin to end the war: first, seeing that a reliable, visible, known pipeline of military support, including American arms and ammunition, will continue to flow to Ukraine uninterrupted; and second, seeing that Russia will not have the oil and gas revenue necessary to simultaneously prosecute the war and continue the functions of the Russian state. We are getting closer to both, but the West must pile on the pressure.
One month ago, President Trump green-lighted European purchases of American arms and ammunition for transfer to Ukraine and charged NATO with its coordination. As announced on August 18, there is now a proposed $90bn pipeline of funding, provided by Europeans, for Ukrainian purchases of American arms and ammunition. NATO countries should make sure that this includes long-range, precision weapons that can take out Russia’s military lines of communication, something Ukraine is increasingly doing with its home-produced drones. NATO should also be tasked to help Ukraine develop a layered, integrated air defense system.
On the economy, Russia’s fundamentals are already on a downward trajectory. Growth has slowed, inflation is officially still almost 9% (and probably much higher), interest rates are an eye-watering 18%, there is an overall labor shortage, and a dearth in supplies of key supplies and components. Even without new Western sanctions, Russia could come to a crunch point by the end of 2025. Tough secondary sanctions by the United States and Europe could hasten this timeline.
The most recent flurry of diplomatic activity has heightened the international focus on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine, but has not yet made any difference in changing Putin’s calculations. Even so, with the passage of time, Russia’s military and economic fundamentals continue to worsen.
Those factors, more than any international meetings, mean that a ceasefire in Ukraine is becoming more likely by the end of 2025. The West should pile on secondary sanctions and open-ended military support as quickly as possible to get Putin to end this war, and to deter the next one.