While Moldova is making progress, Georgia is falling back

 It is hard to believe the shift in Georgia and Moldova’s prospects for accession. While Chisinau has emerged from a long period of uncertainty to champion the EU cause, Tbilisi is rapidly losing momentum in its negotiations. The reason for this change lies in two clearly contrasting governments

Moldova and Georgia share a similar geopolitical position, but their recent election outcomes could not be more different in signalling their future paths toward Europe. While Moldova is moving steadily toward EU integration, Georgia seems increasingly stuck, with its political landscape raising questions about its commitment to European values.

Moldova’s recent elections, which reaffirmed a pro-European government, reflect a population determined to advance toward EU integration despite external pressures chiefly from Russia. Undeterred, Moldovans re-elected a government committed to strengthening EU ties. This sets Moldova apart from Georgia, where pro-European aspirations are not mirrored in government leadership. In Moldova, President Sandu’s alignment with these goals helps citizens overcome many obstacles, even on a razor-thin margin, allowing pro-European forces more time to consolidate their position.

In Georgia, by contrast, a political disconnect stifles momentum. While over 85 per cent of Georgian citizens favour joining the EU, a higher proportion than in Moldova, the ruling Georgian Dream party resists these aspirations and, instead of reflecting pro-European sentiment, echoes Russian propaganda. Unlike in Moldova, Georgian citizens who support European integration lack representation in leadership. It is important to remember that voters in Georgia, having repeatedly witnessed the devastation of war, are vulnerable to fears that GD has skilfully linked to anti-western narratives.

In Georgia, we are now left with a government controlled by the country’s wealthiest man, an oligarch with deep ties to Russia. He has already been flagged by European institutions as the sole oligarch of the country. His government, marred by high levels of corruption, sees closer alignment with western democracies as a threat to its interests, making it advantageous to stall Georgia’s European aspirations. This is because being an EU member would make it much harder to continue these practices, especially for a country of Georgia’s size. Meanwhile, Moldova is charging ahead, tackling corruption under Sandu’s leadership and standing out as a beacon of democratic progress in Eastern Europe, far outpacing Georgia in its reforms.

This leadership stance has had various consequences: the European Commission’s recent enlargement report acknowledged Moldova’s progress but froze Georgia’s accession process due to unmet commitments. Meanwhile, the credibility of Georgia’s elections has also suffered, as the dispute over the parliamentary voting results continues.

Perhaps most telling is the international response to Georgia’s election results. Unlike Moldova, whose leadership was quickly recognized and congratulated by the EU and US, Georgia’s ruling party received acknowledgment primarily from non-western countries. Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Venezuela, China and Iran were among the few to congratulate the Georgian Dream party on its victory. Above all this is an indication of Georgia’s growing diplomatic isolation from its democratic allies. Russia’s foreign minister even announced his country’s readiness to continue normalizing relations with Georgia, highlighting the country’s drift toward Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Meanwhile, the EU and the US withheld any endorsement, with President Joe Biden calling on the Georgian government to investigate reports of election-related abuses, including voter intimidation and coercion. This selective recognition both reflects Georgia’s current distance from the West and signals potential repercussions regarding its path to the EU if it continues on this trajectory.

The Georgian government’s actions and election outcomes are taking a toll on its finances. The EU and several western countries have frozen aid and suspended joint projects, citing concerns over Georgia’s alignment with EU values. This loss of international support not only limits crucial funding but also signals to Georgians that their government’s choices may be jeopardizing ties with the West. Meanwhile, Moldova’s pro-European stance is paying off, with endorsements from EU and US leaders and substantial financial support from Brussels. These offer a clear sign of confidence in Moldova’s path toward integration.

The Georgian government faces renewed domestic and international pressure, echoing the tensions of the 2020 elections and underscoring lessons yet to be learned. Now, with the president herself calling the results rigged, the opposition is gaining support from international partners who are withholding formal recognition. Yet, both these hopes are precarious, much like walking a fine line.

On the one hand, the opposition must demonstrate stronger unity and resilience in these protests. They should recognize that, while many citizens are fighting for a European future, this does not automatically translate into support for their parties. Even now, when the Georgian Dream government manipulatively announced the suspension of all EU accession talks until 2028, sparking protests from hundreds of thousands of Georgians, there remains a lack of strong leadership. The opposition lacks sufficient strength and continues to rely primarily on the missteps of the GD government to fuel their momentum.

The opposition’s key misstep during the pre-election campaign was assuming that pro-western voters would fully support them, which weakened their overall appeal. Georgia’s opposition, who share aspirations similar to Sandu’s government, did not just appear weak. Overall, they seemed unaware of the impact of this fear-based strategy.

On the other hand, the continued silence from international partners, especially the EU (with the US preoccupied with its own challenges), could ultimately harm Georgia more than help. While it has not explicitly caused isolation, suspending Georgia’s EU accession process risks pushing the country closer to illiberal forces like Russia. Even Viktor Orbán of Hungary’s “friendly” visits highlight who is attempting to take the lead in Georgia’s case. Staying neutral on the election only worsens the situation.

Irakli Machaidze is a Georgian political writer, analytical journalist and fellow with Young Voices Europe. Irakli is currently based in New York, US, pursuing advanced studies in International Relations and working as a fellow at Columbia University. He specializes in EU policy and regional security in Europe.