Vaccines, cameras and military exercises in the function of China's 'hard power' in the Western Balkans

It began with the expansion of Confucius Institutes, joint academic programs, and ended with major economic and infrastructure agreements, and technological influence. Today, China's presence in six Western Balkan countries is multifaceted, from cultural to economic diplomacy.
The expansion of its presence in the Balkans has been happening since 2013-14, when China launched the "Belt and Road" initiative.
The Belt and Road Initiative is the world's largest infrastructure project, involving 65 countries and international organizations (nearly 4.5 billion people). As part of it, Beijing announced the "Digital Silk Road" a decade ago, in 2015.

From 'soft' to corrupt power, thanks to vaccines
The expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative has been characterized by the gradual transformation of so-called "soft" into "hard" power.
"'Hard power' is corrupt 'soft power,'" Paolo Pizzolo, a visiting researcher at the Center for International Studies and Development at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, the oldest university in Poland, told Radio Free Europe (RFE).
The turning point from "soft" to "hard" power in the Balkans, Pizzolo emphasizes, occurred "when China began to act more aggressively, in terms of its approach to the region."

China's Hard Power
Radio Free Europe (RFE) is investigating China's "hard power" in the Western Balkans and globally. "Hard power" is defined as an approach to international politics that involves censorship and manipulation to undermine the integrity of independent institutions. Through a variety of mechanisms of application, "hard power" aims to restrict freedom of expression and destabilize the political environment. It refers to the ability to influence others to achieve a desired outcome, not by appealing to the public as is the case with "soft power", but by disseminating and manipulating information. How does China use it?

"I believe it started around 2019, which means just before the COVID pandemic," the source said.

"A concrete example of this was the vaccine campaign, when China began to portray Western countries as ineffective in providing aid to the Balkans and presented itself as a force that immediately came to the rescue. Vaccine diplomacy was the use of a form of 'hard power,'" Pizzolo said.
Beijing reacted quickly and offered support to Serbia after it declared a state of emergency in March 2021, after restrictions on exports from EU countries had previously prevented access to medical equipment. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić called European solidarity a "fairy tale" at the time and added that only China was ready to provide assistance to Serbia.
The EU has pledged to provide 70 million euros to six potential EU members in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, for the purchase of vaccines, but while waiting for deliveries, Serbia began mass vaccination with the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine in January 2021, as well as the Russian Sputnik V vaccine.
Thus, Serbia emerged at the forefront of China's regional "vaccine diplomacy" in Europe. It all happened at a time when Beijing was aiming to increase its global influence by sending its vaccines to poorer countries, thereby filling the vacuum left by Western countries.
As the English-language editorial staff of Radio Free Europe (RFE) wrote in early 2021, for China, providing vaccines to Serbia was intended to be an important geopolitical victory.
In February 2021, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that they had delivered COVID vaccines to 53 countries around the world for free.
"This is the moment when 'soft power' transformed into 'hard' in a much more decisive and specific way. Simply because it became, in addition to cultural and ordinary economic influence, a way to manipulate public perception of China and the opinion that countries, peoples of the region have about that country, especially through technological development and technological means," explains Pizzolo.
"It is a hybrid or asymmetric strategy. Instead of using 'hard' power, which is military power, coercive economics, China's 'hard' power uses information propaganda or a propaganda view of China to persuade, so to speak, win people's minds," Pizzolo points out.
Technological development has been key in the practices of "hard" power.
Indicators from a public opinion survey by the International Republican Institute from September 2020 can serve as an illustration.

At the time when vaccine diplomacy was in full swing, BiH and North Macedonia had a positive attitude towards China of over 50 percent, while in Montenegro it was significantly higher, 68 percent, and in Serbia as much as 85.

Examples of 'hard' power in Serbia

A striking example of "hard power" in the Western Balkans is the "Safe City" project that Serbia began implementing with China in 2019. The project was launched in 2017, when the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and the Chinese company Huawei signed the "Strategic Partnership Agreement for the Introduction of eLTE Technologies and Solutions for Safe City in the Field of Public Security".
The essence of the "Safe City" project is the introduction of an intelligent video surveillance system, i.e. the presence of facial recognition software.
"First of all, we must remember that Serbia is China's main partner in the Western Balkans and that it is a reference point", Pizzolo points out.
Regarding the "Safe City" project, Pizzolo says that it is a frightening undertaking because "basically it is a real, concrete example of using technology to control people in a very undemocratic way".

Macchina Security and local governments in Serbia
These are the local governments that have a contract with Macchina Security. All purchase amounts are in US dollars.
Chinese law requires Chinese technology companies to provide data collected through cameras and facial recognition technology to Chinese intelligence services. This is an evidently undemocratic practice that violates data privacy.

"This means that Chinese intelligence services have the capacity to collect all the data on the people they monitor, which is again only possible because the Chinese and Serbian intelligence services cooperate closely. Of course, this is a win-win strategy because the Chinese government and companies have gained control over this project, while, on the other hand, it is very useful for the Serbian police and army," says Pizzolo, adding that this is a technology that could, for example, be used by the Serbian Security and Information Agency to collect data on participants in anti-government protests.
The installation of the cameras in Belgrade was controversial because Serbia does not have appropriate data privacy laws for processing information taken from facial recognition recordings.
In 2022, RFE/RL found that Chinese technology was being used in Serbia to track and target activists and protesters, raising concerns that this type of Chinese-made equipment could be misused.
Another example of China's growing "hard power" in Serbia is its growing armaments, military training, and joint military and police exercises between the two countries.
Serbia is, after Belarus, the second European country and the only one among the EU candidate countries to have conducted military exercises with China.
The training of special units of the Chinese and Serbian armies, called "Peacekeeper 2025", was carried out in late July in the northern Chinese province of Hebei. A year earlier, in early July 2024, Belarus had held "Eagle Attack 2024" exercises with China near the city of Brest, just five kilometers from the border with NATO member Poland.
The Serbian Ministry of Defense assessed that the military training "gave impetus to strengthening military cooperation" between China and Serbia. Serbia is militarily neutral, but is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, within the framework of which it cooperates with the alliance.
The Serbian Ministry of Defense did not respond to RFE/RL's request for comment on the fact that the military training with China was held despite a warning from Brussels. When the military training was announced in mid-July 2025, an EU spokesperson told RFE/RL that "Serbia should refrain from actions and statements that contradict the EU's foreign policy positions".
Of the great powers, Russia and China play significant roles in Serbia's international politics despite geographical distance and, in China's case, cultural differences.
Such a large influence can be attributed to the economic benefits they provide, but also to political issues such as the issue of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Serbia in May 2024 coincided with the 25th anniversary of the NATO bombing, during which one of the targets was the then Chinese embassy building in New Belgrade.

The airstrike in Belgrade killed three people, including two Chinese journalists. At least 20 people were injured. A new Chinese Cultural Center building was built on the same site years later.
Xi said during his visit to Serbia in May 2024: "The friendship between China and Serbia was forged with the blood of our compatriots, it will remain in the common memory of the people of Serbia and China and will inspire us to march forward with great strides."
"The idea of diversification can be interpreted in Vučić's pragmatic approach," however, as Pizzolo states, "it is a big question for the West, the European Union, NATO, because China and its military exercises with Serbia, which borders the NATO alliance and the EU, pose a potential threat."

Montenegro's Dual Strategy

Montenegro received a warning from the State Department in late July 2025 when the United States expressed its concerns over reports of cooperation between the University of Montenegro and China's Jinan National Supercomputing Center.
Pizzolo points out that "cybersecurity issues are always difficult to deal with because they imply difficulties for a country to implement and protect its basic infrastructure and basic national security apparatus."
"Of course, this was contrary to Montenegro's current policy as a NATO member and of course it also goes against EU integration," he says.
In 2023, the US State Department ranked Montenegro among the most indebted countries in the Western Balkans due to its high public debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio. The cost of the Bar-Boljare highway has caused political tensions, and accusations of corruption and inefficiency have caused public discontent.
The first 41-kilometer section was built by the China Road And Bridge Corporation (CRBC), over seven years with five delays, with a loan of $944 million from EXIM Bank and an additional $90 million for access roads.
Due to fiscal problems, the state, with EU mediation, entered into a hedging arrangement with US and European banks. The loan for the first section is to be repaid by 2035, and the debt at the end of March 2025 amounted to €603 million, decreasing by about €60 million per year. The construction was accompanied by lack of transparency, fiscal and environmental problems, which the EU has repeatedly warned about.
"The case of Montenegro is very important because Gora Gora is following a dual strategy. One, which is staying close to the NATO alliance and joining the EU. On the other hand, there is a component in the Montenegrin public that is quite anti-Western. Which sees the West, I wouldn't say as an enemy, but as a potential rival, but in any case with a negative connotation," assesses Pizzolo, emphasizing that China understands this well, as does Russia, and that they are using such a mood to put the smallest country in the Western Balkans under their influence.

China’s interest is to avoid full stability in BiH

In economic terms, relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and China have intensified over the past few years.
Similar to developments in Serbia, China is becoming an important player in sectors where Western companies have been slowly withdrawing their involvement.
Examples where Chinese construction companies have participated include coal-fired thermal power plants, such as the 300 MW Stanari thermal power plant near the city of Doboj.
Beijing has promoted "soft" power strategies similar to "hard" power focused on digital technologies that rely heavily on propaganda and disinformation.
This can be clearly seen through public opinion polls in the Western Balkans, which show a generally positive attitude towards China in the countries of the region, which is not the case in the member states of the European Union.

China's Less Influence in Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia
China is present in North Macedonia mainly through the media, which includes local stations Kanal 5, Makfaks.
The head of the State Intelligence Agency, Erold Musliu, told RFE/RL in April 2024 that there is Chinese disinformation propaganda in North Macedonia that takes the form of a campaign and produces Euroscepticism, while on the other hand offering citizens an alternative through the country's membership in BRICS and the Eurasian Union.
Musliu did not reveal which "actors", political or media, he classifies in this group.

"The point with Kosovo is that China does not even recognize Kosovo's sovereignty and considers it an autonomous province of Serbia, so the Kosovo government does not and does not want to strengthen cooperation with China," Pizzolo pointed out.
Consequently, the two countries do not even have diplomatic relations, but China has had a Liaison Office in Kosovo for years, which operates under the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
To visit Kosovo, Chinese citizens must have a visa, except for those with diplomatic passports. Visas can be obtained at the Kosovo embassy in Albania or Turkey.
Even Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti has described China as an "enemy" on several occasions, according to RFE/RL's Kosovo Service.
When it comes to Albania and Kosovo, the situation is different, since "China's presence is not appreciated there," as Pizzolo says.
"Poenta sa Kosovom je da Kina čak ni ne priznaje suverenitet Kosova i smatra da je autonomna pokrajina Srbije, tako da vlada Kosova neće i ne želi da jača saradnju sa Kinom", ukazao je Pizzolo.
Posljedično, dvije zemlje nemaju čak ni diplomatske odnose, ali Kina već godinama ima Kancelariju za vezu na Kosovu, koja djeluje pri Ambasadi Kine u Beogradu.
Da bi posjetili Kosovo, građani Kine moraju imati vizu, osim onih koji imaju diplomatske pasoše. Vize se mogu dobiti u ambasadi Kosova u Albaniji ili Turskoj.
Čak je i premijer Kosova Aljbin Kurti (Albin Kurti) u nekoliko navrata opisao Kinu kao "neprijatelja" prema pisanju Kosovskog servisa RSE.

Three Principles of China's Modern Warfare Doctrine
Technologies closely related to China's so-called Three Doctrines of Warfare, which define interstate conflicts through three principles:
• Legal warfare uses international law and advanced strategic goals
• Media warfare uses technologies to shape public and international opinion
• Psychological warfare is the manipulation of information to influence an opponent's decision-making and behavior.

Pizzolo says it is important to revive the "Berlin Process", which was launched in 2014 as a platform for stronger cooperation between the six Western Balkan countries and the EU.

"The EU has an interest in avoiding that China's penetration of the Western Balkans becomes too significant due to the geographical proximity and the many interests that the EU has in the region. It is in the EU's interest to accelerate the integration processes of the Western Balkan countries. Otherwise, if this integration is slowed down or even stopped, other countries, starting with China, will take advantage of it," Pizzolo warned.
China has a very sophisticated propaganda apparatus. Historically, the Communist Party of China has worked hard to define this type of strategy. Today, propaganda is one of the three pillars of China's asymmetric war towards the rest of the world, as shown by the three doctrines of Chinese modern warfare.
"The main idea is that war can be won without fighting, but only by persuasion, which becomes a means of coercion through propaganda means. Specifically, the development of technology is the main tool used by China," Pizzolo concludes.

CONCLUSION 

China's influence in the Western Balkans is present to varying degrees. So far, much has been said about China's "soft power", which seeks to strengthen its influence in the Western Balkans through cultural and educational cooperation, but analysts warn that China's "soft power" is being replaced by the so-called "hard power". In addition to infrastructure and investment projects in the Western Balkans, the use of software and equipment from China has increased in recent years, which may result in a security risk for citizens of the Western Balkans.
Although there are warnings and negative practices regarding the use of software and equipment from China, and in Western countries they are either completely banned for use or are slowly being removed from the system, the authorities of the Western Balkans countries (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) continue to purchase software and equipment from Chinese companies. The practice of purchasing this type of software or equipment without a public call for tenders continues, and the signed contracts are hidden from the public, non-transparent and there is suspicion of corruption.
The authorities of the "Western Balkans" countries should take more care of the interests of their own citizens and protect their security, primarily because software and equipment are paid for with budget funds, that is, citizens' money.