14.07.2021.

Russian influence in Kosovo: Resolving the Serbian issue or securing its own influence in Europe

Russia has long been involved in conflicts that allow it to exert its own influence on individual countries and regions that it sees as its strategic interest. One of such conflicts that has burdened the Western Balkans for more than twenty years is the one in Kosovo.

Russia is trying to be present in this part of Europe which is also an interesting sphere of the West, through Serbia, through propaganda, incitement, bribery and other "soft power" means.

 

Russia, as a former superpower, dominated by the imperial mentality and haunted by former glory, is trying to preserve its own dignity. By wanting to get involved in resolving the Kosovo issue in the 1990s, Russia wanted to regain part of the "old glory" it lost with the collapse of the USSR. Opposing the interests of the West when it comes to Kosovo, gave Russia the opportunity to play the role of a disruptive factor, but only with limited capacities, because Russia at that time was still not capable of a stronger confrontation with the West.

 

The views of Russia and the West openly clashed after Russia's opposition to NATO military action in March 1999. Namely, Russia protested when NATO, without the mandate of the UN Security Council, on March 24, 1999. , launched an air military intervention in order, among other things, to force the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), ie Serbia, to withdraw its army from Kosovo. NATO's military intervention was preceded by an armed conflict between Serbs and Albanians that lasted from 1996 to 1999. Serbia's goal was to keep Kosovo in Serbia, while the Albanians wanted independence for Kosovo.

 

Russia knowingly provoked the conflict

 

After unsuccessful negotiations, NATO decided on a military operation by air strikes, through Operation Allied Force, against the FRY, although neither Russia nor the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved it. Russia, however, continued to negotiate, so the NATO operation was later supplemented by an agreement between NATO and Russia in such a way that Russian troops could participate, under special command, as part of the peacekeeping force in occupying and controlling territories after the withdrawal of the Serbian army. However, in July 1999, during the ceasefire, the Russian Ministry of Defense carried out a surprise operation in which it transferred its 186 paratroopers from Bosnia and Herzegovina by land, occupying Slatina Airport in Kosovo. In this way, Russia consciously went to provoke a conflict with the British NATO forces, but it did not happen by the decision of the British army.

 

The UNSC soon adopted Resolution 1244, which introduced an international presence in Kosovo (UN Mission in Kosovo) and established a general framework for resolving Kosovo's final political and legal status. After making significant diplomatic efforts to end the war, Russia eventually took part, albeit under special conditions, in NATO's KFOR operations. NATO's position was that the intervention carried out in the FRY was necessary in order to stop the massive human rights violations against the Albanian population in Kosovo and thus avoid regional confrontation. On the other hand, Russia considered that the NATO military intervention in the FRY grossly violated the basic principles of international law.

 

 

The Russians protected their own interests

 

Although Russia opposed military action against the FRY, since the beginning of the crisis in Kosovo, it has been involved in the process of resolving it in order to protect its interests, and not the interests of Serbia. By withdrawing its troops from the KFOR peacekeeping force in 2003, Russia showed in practice that it was less and less interested and engaged in seeking a solution to the situation in Kosovo. By withdrawing its troops in 2003 in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Russia suspended its military engagement in the Western Balkans because it probably needed troops in other areas, demonstrating Moscow's essential lack of strategic interest in the Western Balkans.

 

This was also demonstrated during the fierce violent clashes between Albanians and Serbs, which broke out in Kosovo in 2004 and lasted for two days (March 17th and 18th). Russia was not militarily present in this area at that time because it withdrew its military contingent a year earlier. Justifying the withdrawal of the Russian contingent, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "the presence of the Russian contingent could not help prevent the outbreak of violence because Russia was not able to decide and influence anything, and that it was not acceptable for Russia." In fact, Russia's priority at the time was to resolve internal problems, and to restore and strengthen its influence in the "close neighborhood" (states that emerged from the collapse of the USSR), given that the strategic importance of those countries was invaluable to Putin, far more important than the Balkans.

 

Thus, the key motive for Russia's involvement in the Kosovo conflict resolution process is its attempt to renew its influence in the Western Balkans, not its assistance to Serbia or its commitment to human rights, which it constantly violates in renegade territories (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh) or in their own country. Also, Russia's position on the Kosovo crisis, which emphasizes Serbia's right to protect its territorial integrity, is interpreted as close to Russia's position on Chechnya because Russia feared that NATO would not carry out a similar intervention in Chechnya.

 

Accordingly, Russia viewed the Kosovo crisis in the context of possible implications for separatist movements in other parts of the world, including regions within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for Russia's relations with the West, as well as Russia's participation in European and global decision-making processes.

 

 

Bearing in mind that the Kosovo issue transcends a purely regional dimension, the consequences of this dispute are still reflected in the "frozen conflicts" in the states that emerged from the collapse of the USSR. Some analysts believe that the recognition of Kosovo's independence has freed Russia from all restrictions and restraint when it comes to policy towards the countries formed in the so-called post-Soviet space. Others see Moscow's behavior as hypocritical, on the one hand strongly opposing Kosovo's independence, and on the other using that precedent to justify its moves in Georgia (recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) or Ukraine (annexation of Crimea).

 

 

 

False protector of Serbia?

 

The Kosovo issue is an item in the relationship between Serbia and Russia in which the greatest engagement of Russia can be seen, which coincides with the protection of Serbian interests. The motives for such an attitude of Russia again lead to the same dilemma, does Russia act as the protector of Serbia or is it part of the rational Russian tactics in the policy of preserving its interests in the Balkans? When Russia does that, then Russia is mostly guided by its various interests, without taking much into account the interests of others, in this case Serbia. Primarily, it is the desire for Serbia, if at all possible, to stay out of Western integration, especially NATO, for as long as possible.

 

In addition, Russia has quite strong political and economic interests in this area, so it does not care whether the "Kosovo issue" will be resolved quickly. Because, when it is resolved, Serbia will no longer need Russian support so much, which, of course, does not suit Russia. So, as long as it is needed, Serbia will give Russia various concessions, either economic or political. Russia still considers itself a superpower, whether it is realistic or not is another matter, it does not want to be excluded from resolving international issues. Being on the sidelines, being out of the solution means practically getting the role of a second-rate factor. And Russia does not want to allow itself that, either because of prestige, or because of vanity, or because of its own self-esteem. Russia is basically a strategic goal to destabilize areas that are in the sphere of Western interest.

 

 

Russian influence in Europe

 

Russia's participation in the case of Kosovo was not a defense of Serbian interests, as it seems at first glance or as it is portrayed in Russia and Serbia, but securing its own influence in Europe. Using "soft power", playing on the card of Orthodoxy and traditionally good relations between Russia and Serbia, Russia wanted to present itself as a protector of Serbian / Orthodox interests in the Western Balkans, in order to cover up its real goals in the Balkans.

 

SLIKA PUTIN VUCIC

 

Many interpret the 1990s engagement as Russia's effort to establish peace at any cost so that NATO would not interfere in resolving Russia's situation with Chechnya and later with other renegade territories to which it wholeheartedly provided political and military support. The temporary loss of public interest in this part of the world did not automatically mean the cessation of Moscow's secret intelligence operations aimed at weakening the support of the local population, primarily Serbian citizens, for European and especially Euro-Atlantic integration, and thus the influence of Western countries on this region.

 

 

Russia has also very often called for the protection of the human rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo, while at the same time grossly violating human rights in countries that are in its "zone of interest" or in breakaway quasi-states.

 

An even bigger paradox is that Russia wants to impose itself as a protector of human leaders in other territories, in order to accuse the West of violating them, while massively violating human rights in the territory of its state by persecuting its political opponents. The cruelty of Putin's regime can also be connected with a series of poisonings and murders by Russian intelligence actions carried out by the GRU and the FSB on European soil in order to get rid of sharp critics of the mentioned regime, which have been committed in recent years. Putin's model of government, where the judicial system is governed by politics, has been shaken, and the people, more than ever before, support opposition politicians, which has been seen through mass support for Alexei Navalny.