From battlefield to ballot box: Why Russia is drafting war veterans into politics

In his February 2024 annual address to parliament and cabinet, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly called for a “renewal” of Russia’s ruling elite. The “new elite”, he said, and those earmarked “to take positions in business, education and public administration”, should include participants in the so-called “special military operation” (SVO), that is, Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Putin seems to be advancing this plan through various channels, including elections. In this year’s regional and municipal races, the ruling party United Russia elected more than 800 officials who previously fought in Ukraine. Last year, roughly 300 veterans were elected overall (local elections are held annually in Russia).

It is unusual to see military figures in Russian elections. Beyond the various formal restrictions—including the requirement that an officer quit their service to run—the ruling  United Russia party and others have traditionally preferred to field public-sector candidates like doctors, teachers or social service workers.

This is now changing. During this year’s campaign, candidates with war experience received disproportionate attention from state media and on social platforms. Regional authorities often made a point to report on the number of registered “SVO candidates”—even though veterans made up less than 1.5% of all contenders. Meanwhile, officials usually offered no comparable breakdown for other professional categories.

The head of a Kremlin-aligned think-tank estimates that veterans of the war in Ukraine could comprise up to 40% of the Duma after the 2026 elections. While this projection is likely exaggerated, it is evident that the Kremlin is testing something new. Promoting these “war candidates”, after all, serves multiple purposes. Some Russia experts see a long-term plan by Putin to create his own “Red Guards”. While that ambition may exist, Putin could be pursuing more immediate, practical goals, such as better integrating returning veterans into society—many have been disproportionately involved in violent crime—and offering an additional recruitment incentive by showing that there is a “life after the SVO”.

The growing influx of veterans into government at every level will broaden the coalition that favours confrontation with Ukraine and the West. The most hawkish positions in the Russian elite come, predictably, from individuals with security backgrounds. If the SVO veterans sideline the technocrats who keep the war economy running, they could emerge as the primary opposition to any future softening of foreign policy even if the Kremlin begins to feel the strain of depleted resources.

The SVO candidates

Most mandates contested in 2025 were municipal, so most of the veteran candidates became local deputies. But they have also succeeded in forming sizeable factions in regional legislatures: In the Chelyabinsk oblast, for example, they secured 6 of 60 seats. In Ryazan’s regional duma, 5 out of 40—a significant increase from previous election cycles.

Six current regional heads have directly taken part in the war in Ukraine or served in the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia since 2022—the latter being another category of service the Kremlin respects and promotes. Two of these leaders were elected this month, such as United Russia’s Evgeny Pervyshov in the Tambov oblast, where he received 74% of the vote.

A former combatant in the war in Ukraine and a graduate of the Time of Heroes programme—which offers management training for career officers appointed to government posts—Pervyshov exemplifies Putin’s “elite renewal”. Launched in 2024, Time of Heroes is one of several such schemes now operating across all Russian regions, with governors even competing over how many servicemen they retrain and integrate into the political system.

While all political parties have become more active in fielding “SVO veterans”, the majority of candidates who secured victories were nominated by United Russia.[1] Meanwhile, war veteran Stepan Soloviev, running in the Komi Republic under a minor party, received less than 3% of the vote. It seems that only those veterans who cooperate with the Kremlin are allowed entry into the “new elite”.

From veteran to hawk

Russian society is showing rising unease about returnees from the front. Because of heavy losses and manpower shortage, ordinary servicemen are rarely allowed to terminate their contracts. Most can only leave if severely wounded—often suffering from PTSD—or if recruited from prisons, as contracts in these cases are typically fixed-term, provided they survive the “meat assaults” to which they are often deployed. Back in their regions, veterans often struggle to find employment and become involved in violent crime, generating public irritation. The Kremlin is responding by promoting the “good” veterans who reintegrate into civilian life and enter politics, especially legislative bodies.

This perception that SVO veterans face bleak prospects after returning home helps explain why, despite rising sign-up bonuses, fewer Russians are willing to go to the front compared to previous years. The Kremlin therefore deploys an additional recruitment incentive: a career path in government after service, via elections or programmes such as Time of Heroes.

However, filling Russia’s government with SVO veterans carries significant long-term risks for the Kremlin. Many of these individuals are ill-prepared for political office, and several have already responded clumsily to social tensions. SVO deputies have less experience on reading public sentiment and defusing social discontent. This comes in a context in which Russia’s regional elections are already losing their function as signals of public opinion, in turn undermining authoritarian control. This year, for example, the Kremlin underestimated popular resistance to the municipal reform that merged multiple districts, and faced some of the largest protests since 2022 in several regions.

The 2026 Duma elections could bring a larger cohort of frontline veterans into federal office. As the cases of Igor Strelkov and the Wagner mutiny illustrate, challenges from the right—by conservative “turbo-patriots”—have proven the most difficult for the Russian regime to contain. If the more moderate voices of the economic and financial ministries shrink, the Kremlin will have to ensure ideological and institutional cohesion around the hardliners. With less room for soft diplomacy, uncompromising stances on border regions, frozen conflicts and hybrid warfare become more likely. Europeans need to monitor these developments and prepare defensive responses.